The World’s oil reserves are drying up. Are we headed towards an energy crisis?
By S S Jeevan
In 1956, legendary geophysicist King Hubbert predicted that US oil production would peak in early 1970s and then slowly decline, in something resembling a bell-shaped curve. At that time, governments scoffed at him and experts rubbished his theory. But his prediction came true in 1970 and following the Arab oil embargo in 1973, prices of oil quadrupled. Forty-five years later, Kenneth S Deffeyes, another geophysicist and professor at Princeton University, used Hubbert’s methods to make fresh forecasts in 2001. It is a scary one: global oil production will ‘peak sometime between 2004 and 2008, and the world’s production of crude oil will fall, never to rise again’.
Is the world running out of oil? And is the 100-year petroleum era nearly over? Two recent developments give credence to this theory. Earlier this month, The New York Times reported that oil major Shell had over-estimated its proven oil reserves in Oman by as much as 40 per cent. The scandal led to the sacking of Philip Watts, Shell’s head of exploration and development. Shell may not be alone. Most oil companies and even governments are known to notoriously hype estimates of how much oil they have.
On March 31, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to cut oil production by 1 million barrels per day, pointing towards a new era of higher oil prices, particularly as demand has increased sharply, especially in Asia. Even the respected New Scientist magazine recently said that peak production year is 2004. Virtually all experts believe that we will certainly be staring at an oil crisis much before the end of this decade.
A growing number of geologists and energy analysts say that global oil reserves may be dangerously exaggerated. “An amazing display of ignorance, deliberate ignorance, denial and obfuscation by governments, industry and academics on this topic,” as geologist Colin Campbell puts it in his award-winning book The Coming Oil Crisis.
In 2000, global production stood at 76 million barrels per day (MBD). By 2020, demand is forecast to reach 112 MBD, an increase of 47 per cent. But additions to proven reserves have virtually stopped and it is clear that pumping at present rates is unsustainable. With oil prices currently at around $38 a barrel, the highest for nearly 15 years, and the threat of diminishing supply, the question of reserves has assumed a greater importance than ever. Especially for a country such as India that is pitifully dependent on imports to take care of its energy needs.
Oil’s not well
India is one of the top six oil-consuming countries in the world. But it has just 0.4 per cent of the world’s petroleum reserves. More than 70 per cent of the country’s oil requirement is met by imports -- 45 per cent of which is from politically volatile countries in the Middle East. Between 1990 and 1999, net imports of crude oil and petroleum products more than doubled. So even a slight increase in international oil prices has huge repercussions on the economy. Consider this: if oil prices rise by US $1, India’s annual oil bill can increase by US $600 million. The International Monetary Fund estimates that every rise of US $5 in the cost of crude oil lowers India’s Gross Domestic Product by 0.5 per cent, raises inflation by 1.5 per cent, and leads to an outflow of Rs 18,000 crore.
Oil also fuels the transportation industry -- 75 per cent of transportation runs on oil. So the cost of transport fuel has a greater impact on the price line since trucks transport many goods. The volatile global oil market has had a telling effect on India. Since April 2000, the price of diesel has gone up by 40 per cent and that of petrol by 23 per cent. And this trend is only bound to get worse.
Estimates suggest that India’s GDP will grow at an average of 5.2 per cent per year till 2025, and oil demand will grow by 4 per cent a year. This translates to oil demand shooting up to 274 million tonnes in 2025. Now it is 115 million tonne a year. India did made some feeble attempts to procure gas from other sources. But these efforts came a cropper. Unocal of USA, which discovered gas in the Bibiyana field of northwest Bangladesh in 1998, wanted to build a 1,363-km pipeline to export gas. But the Bangladeshi government has been unable to decide if it wants to allow export of gas to India. Now officials are negotiating with Myanmar for its oil and gas reserves in the hope that Bangladesh will sign the agreement.
The pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan has been discussed for over 10 years. But nothing much has happened. An undersea pipeline fetching gas from Iran or Qatar is yet to take off. Another project to fetch gas from Oman has been shelved after eight years of study and expenses of Rs 330 crore. An undersea pipeline is anywhere between two to ten times as expensive as one over land. The process to deregulate the oil sector has been going on for some time now. But experts are quite pessimistic about the NELP (New Exploration Licensing Policy), which they say will not be able to meet the rising demand. Privatising the sector too could well be a stopgap arrangement, nothing short of buying time. Sooner or later oil reserves are going to dry up the world over.
A renewable crisis
It is fashionable to talk of renewable energy, even for the oil cartel bigwigs. Substitutes for oil exist: fusion, fuel cells, high-powered batteries, electric, solar, hybrid etc. But none of them are worth a thing because nobody has prototyped it to be sold on a large scale. The nexus of governments and oil industry is far too strong for even those wanting to make earnest efforts at renewable energy.
There is one other reason why renewable energy sources are at a disadvantage: subsidy. In most countries, taxpayers’ money is used to subsidise the price of fossil fuels, keeping them artificially low. Because of this renewable energy options remain uncompetitive. And cleaner-fuel cars are prohibitive to say the least. So any possibility of a transition to cleaner energy options like solar and wind power or fuel cells remains elusive. Is there a way out?
In 1987, the Indian government’s Renewable Energy Development Agency set up a number of programmes to reduce oil-based electricity usage. Today, we are the largest user of photovoltaic systems in the world. China too adopted a nationwide energy efficiency programme in the 1980s. Within a decade, overall energy intensity fell by 50 per cent even as its economy grew rapidly. As Hubbert’s predictions threaten come true in a fuel-guzzling world, we need to realize that we are heading towards a slippery future.
(New Indian Express, May 2, 2004)
WATERSHED AWARD
Tamil Nadu is elated but the discontent in Karnataka over the Cauvery Tribunal order means that the last has not been heard in the long-drawn-out battle over sharing of the river’s water
By S S Jeevan and Stephen David
It’s a dispute that has fanned political embers in two southern states for over 50 years, testing the patience of the best of negotiators and making a mockery of attempts to arrive at a settlement by different parties. It has frustrated the efforts of successive chief ministers and widened the differences between the two states, leading to emotional outbursts and violent clashes. But as the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (CWDT) gave its final verdict on February 5 after a wait of over 16 years, Tamil Nadu had reasons to feel relieved. “Justice has been done to the state,” said Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi.
Across the border in Karnataka, emotions ran high as politicians and the public cried foul. Cauvery, which originates in the Brahmagiri hill range in Karnataka and winds 780 km through three southern states before emptying into the Arabian Sea, is not only dear to farmers—it is also a big stepping-stone to wannabe politicos who find it easy to whip up passions on the politics of water.
The CWDT, comprising Chairman Justice N.P. Singh and members N.S. Rao and Sudhir Narain, in a unanimous award asked Karnataka to make available 419 tmcft to Tamil Nadu and 7 tmcft to Puducherry. This is better than what Tamil Nadu could have expected. In an interim award on June 25, 1991, the tribunal had directed Karnataka to release 205 tmcft each year to Tamil Nadu at Mettur, of which Tamil Nadu had to release 6 tmcft to Puducherry. Though the state had argued for 562 tmcft of water to meet irrigation, domestic and industrial requirements, most people seem satisfied with the verdict.
Experts believe that the final award eliminates the possibility of disputes over claims and counter-claims of quantity and quality of water. The CWDT has also fixed monthly release schedule and the award will come into effect within 90 days of its notification by the Centre. For Karunanidhi, the decision has come at the right time. Having been unable to achieve a breakthrough in the Mullaperiyar Dam with his Kerala counterpart, he has lost no time in taking the credit. “I have been discussing the issue with 11 Karnataka chief ministers since 1968. Only now a favourable decision has been arrived at,” he said. The Opposition in the state has, however, come out against the verdict. AIADMK chief J. Jayalalithaa said the state should move the Supreme Court to get more water.
In Karnataka, the tribunal’s order is not seen as the last word in the dispute. The last interim order by the tribunal in 1991 saw riots breaking out in south Karnataka after it was felt that the order weighed heavily in favour of Tamil Nadu. This time, 16,000 policemen were out in Bangalore alone. Karnataka Chief Minister H.D. Kumaraswamy called for an all party meeting to take a decision on going for appeal against the “black Monday” order even as the Akhila Karnataka Gadi Horata Samiti, an umbrella organisation of pro-Kannada groups, announced a Karnataka bandh on February 8. Samiti president Vatal Nagaraj called the order a death sentence for the state. “You will have no drinking water in Bangalore if we follow this order,” he said.
But more than looking at the Cauvery as a source of water for cities like Bangalore, some fringe Kannada groups like Kannada Rakshana Vedike and many self-styled native saviours are going around parts of the state showing off their strength by forcing the Government to shut down schools and colleges.
But both Kumaraswamy and Karunanidhi feel that only a political dialogue can find a solution to the order. “It is a very bitter award for the state,” says Kumaraswamy, who is planning to cash in on his pro-farmer image and go on a statewide tour to talk about the Centre’s alleged ill-treatment to his state.
Cauvery is an emotive issue in Karnataka. That is why the late Rajkumar, the king of Kannada cinema, came out in public to lead a rally over Cauvery in September 2002 on behalf of the Kannada film and TV industry. The “silent” rally, dubbed ‘Cauvery nammadu’ (Cauvery is ours) featuring Kannada stars like Shivrajumar, Upendra, Ravichandran, Ramesh, Srinath, Devraj, Sudeep, Jayamala, Umasri, Sriraksha and Pramila Joshi had also brought Bangalore to a halt.
The plus side to the February 5 order is that the CWDT has accepted Karnataka’s argument for a distress formula and said that when the yield is less, the allocated shares will be proportionately reduced among all the states. It also lifted the 11.2 lakh hectare ceiling imposed on Karnataka, which means that the state is now free to make judicious use of the excess water when the monsoon is good. It has also given the green signal for taking up hydro-electric projects in the common reach boundary provided the specified water releases are ensured. An independent regulatory authority to monitor the monthly releases is also a welcome move by Tamil Nadu, but Karnataka is hoping that it will not be there when it appeals in the Supreme Court against the tribunal’s order. While making political capital is one thing, the ground reality that can help the Kumaraswamy regime now is blessings by the rain gods. Good rains in the intermediate and lower catchment areas result in an abundance of water that could help keep Kumaraswamy out of trouble. Meanwhile, the finalé to the dispute is yet to flood in.
(India Today, February 19, 2007)
By S S Jeevan and Stephen David
It’s a dispute that has fanned political embers in two southern states for over 50 years, testing the patience of the best of negotiators and making a mockery of attempts to arrive at a settlement by different parties. It has frustrated the efforts of successive chief ministers and widened the differences between the two states, leading to emotional outbursts and violent clashes. But as the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (CWDT) gave its final verdict on February 5 after a wait of over 16 years, Tamil Nadu had reasons to feel relieved. “Justice has been done to the state,” said Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi.
Across the border in Karnataka, emotions ran high as politicians and the public cried foul. Cauvery, which originates in the Brahmagiri hill range in Karnataka and winds 780 km through three southern states before emptying into the Arabian Sea, is not only dear to farmers—it is also a big stepping-stone to wannabe politicos who find it easy to whip up passions on the politics of water.
The CWDT, comprising Chairman Justice N.P. Singh and members N.S. Rao and Sudhir Narain, in a unanimous award asked Karnataka to make available 419 tmcft to Tamil Nadu and 7 tmcft to Puducherry. This is better than what Tamil Nadu could have expected. In an interim award on June 25, 1991, the tribunal had directed Karnataka to release 205 tmcft each year to Tamil Nadu at Mettur, of which Tamil Nadu had to release 6 tmcft to Puducherry. Though the state had argued for 562 tmcft of water to meet irrigation, domestic and industrial requirements, most people seem satisfied with the verdict.
Experts believe that the final award eliminates the possibility of disputes over claims and counter-claims of quantity and quality of water. The CWDT has also fixed monthly release schedule and the award will come into effect within 90 days of its notification by the Centre. For Karunanidhi, the decision has come at the right time. Having been unable to achieve a breakthrough in the Mullaperiyar Dam with his Kerala counterpart, he has lost no time in taking the credit. “I have been discussing the issue with 11 Karnataka chief ministers since 1968. Only now a favourable decision has been arrived at,” he said. The Opposition in the state has, however, come out against the verdict. AIADMK chief J. Jayalalithaa said the state should move the Supreme Court to get more water.
In Karnataka, the tribunal’s order is not seen as the last word in the dispute. The last interim order by the tribunal in 1991 saw riots breaking out in south Karnataka after it was felt that the order weighed heavily in favour of Tamil Nadu. This time, 16,000 policemen were out in Bangalore alone. Karnataka Chief Minister H.D. Kumaraswamy called for an all party meeting to take a decision on going for appeal against the “black Monday” order even as the Akhila Karnataka Gadi Horata Samiti, an umbrella organisation of pro-Kannada groups, announced a Karnataka bandh on February 8. Samiti president Vatal Nagaraj called the order a death sentence for the state. “You will have no drinking water in Bangalore if we follow this order,” he said.
But more than looking at the Cauvery as a source of water for cities like Bangalore, some fringe Kannada groups like Kannada Rakshana Vedike and many self-styled native saviours are going around parts of the state showing off their strength by forcing the Government to shut down schools and colleges.
But both Kumaraswamy and Karunanidhi feel that only a political dialogue can find a solution to the order. “It is a very bitter award for the state,” says Kumaraswamy, who is planning to cash in on his pro-farmer image and go on a statewide tour to talk about the Centre’s alleged ill-treatment to his state.
Cauvery is an emotive issue in Karnataka. That is why the late Rajkumar, the king of Kannada cinema, came out in public to lead a rally over Cauvery in September 2002 on behalf of the Kannada film and TV industry. The “silent” rally, dubbed ‘Cauvery nammadu’ (Cauvery is ours) featuring Kannada stars like Shivrajumar, Upendra, Ravichandran, Ramesh, Srinath, Devraj, Sudeep, Jayamala, Umasri, Sriraksha and Pramila Joshi had also brought Bangalore to a halt.
The plus side to the February 5 order is that the CWDT has accepted Karnataka’s argument for a distress formula and said that when the yield is less, the allocated shares will be proportionately reduced among all the states. It also lifted the 11.2 lakh hectare ceiling imposed on Karnataka, which means that the state is now free to make judicious use of the excess water when the monsoon is good. It has also given the green signal for taking up hydro-electric projects in the common reach boundary provided the specified water releases are ensured. An independent regulatory authority to monitor the monthly releases is also a welcome move by Tamil Nadu, but Karnataka is hoping that it will not be there when it appeals in the Supreme Court against the tribunal’s order. While making political capital is one thing, the ground reality that can help the Kumaraswamy regime now is blessings by the rain gods. Good rains in the intermediate and lower catchment areas result in an abundance of water that could help keep Kumaraswamy out of trouble. Meanwhile, the finalé to the dispute is yet to flood in.
(India Today, February 19, 2007)
MISSION THIRST AID
Restoration of traditional water tanks has rejuvenated life in parched areas and helped revive agriculture
It is often said that a picture is worth a thousand words. But the seemingly dead calmness that greets you in Vellinipatti, a village in Madurai district, belies the intense struggle of the local people for water. For years the 1,500 people of this village, who primarily depend on agriculture for livelihood, had to fight with each other over every drop of water available. Over 30 years of encroachments had turned their 1000-year-old, 27-acre water tank into a ruin and choked water supply. But today all that has changed. Their tank is overflowing with water.
Similarly there are hundreds of such tanks in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Puducherri that have been renovated through an initiative by NGO Dhan Foundation. “We have realised that reviving surface water through community efforts is probably the only way to take the pressure off from groundwater and restore livelihoods,” says Dhan’s executive director M.P. Vasimalai. Water tanks, one of the oldest man-made ecosystems, have irrigated about 6.5 million hectares of land since the early 1950s. But over the decades, their numbers had declined.
The road to their revival was meticulously planned. For instance, the organisation conducted a detailed survey of the water table with the help of local people, civil, hydraulic and irrigation engineers and then devised a restoration strategy. With inputs from government agencies and local communities, the tanks were renovated within a timespan of two-three months. The cost of the whole renovation project—Rs 20 lakh—was shared between the Government, the funding agency as well as the village community.
“As a social system, tanks have served and benefitted various groups of the village community, such as farmers, fishermen and especially the women who had to trudge long distances to fetch water,” says A. Gurunathan, a programme leader of the project. The support that the local people are giving to this initiative is also commendable. Earlier, encroachments in Athigarikulam tank in Andipatti of the Theni district had forced farmers to migrate to other villages due to the non-availability of water for irrigation. But with the initiative of the local people and with the assistance of the district collector, the tank was revived.
Courts too have stepped in periodically, giving a muchneeded fillip to these community initiatives. “The efforts have not just triggered a water movement, but given back the management of water in the hands of the community, as has been the case for centuries,” adds Vasimalai.
(India Today, May 7, 2007)
It is often said that a picture is worth a thousand words. But the seemingly dead calmness that greets you in Vellinipatti, a village in Madurai district, belies the intense struggle of the local people for water. For years the 1,500 people of this village, who primarily depend on agriculture for livelihood, had to fight with each other over every drop of water available. Over 30 years of encroachments had turned their 1000-year-old, 27-acre water tank into a ruin and choked water supply. But today all that has changed. Their tank is overflowing with water.
Similarly there are hundreds of such tanks in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Puducherri that have been renovated through an initiative by NGO Dhan Foundation. “We have realised that reviving surface water through community efforts is probably the only way to take the pressure off from groundwater and restore livelihoods,” says Dhan’s executive director M.P. Vasimalai. Water tanks, one of the oldest man-made ecosystems, have irrigated about 6.5 million hectares of land since the early 1950s. But over the decades, their numbers had declined.
The road to their revival was meticulously planned. For instance, the organisation conducted a detailed survey of the water table with the help of local people, civil, hydraulic and irrigation engineers and then devised a restoration strategy. With inputs from government agencies and local communities, the tanks were renovated within a timespan of two-three months. The cost of the whole renovation project—Rs 20 lakh—was shared between the Government, the funding agency as well as the village community.
“As a social system, tanks have served and benefitted various groups of the village community, such as farmers, fishermen and especially the women who had to trudge long distances to fetch water,” says A. Gurunathan, a programme leader of the project. The support that the local people are giving to this initiative is also commendable. Earlier, encroachments in Athigarikulam tank in Andipatti of the Theni district had forced farmers to migrate to other villages due to the non-availability of water for irrigation. But with the initiative of the local people and with the assistance of the district collector, the tank was revived.
Courts too have stepped in periodically, giving a muchneeded fillip to these community initiatives. “The efforts have not just triggered a water movement, but given back the management of water in the hands of the community, as has been the case for centuries,” adds Vasimalai.
(India Today, May 7, 2007)
BEAT ABOUT BUSH
He may not have a clean environmental track record. But as president, George W Bush will have to tread carefully
AS GEORGE W BUSH heads for the White House, a wave of scepticism greets this former Texas governor. Bush arrives in Washington with a weak public mandate and a divided congress. What that will mean for the environment, is a question that is as riddled as the unending recounts and court cases that preceded his ‘victory'. One thing is certain: Bush will not be able to take a hardline stance on any issue, even if he wants to.
Judging from his past, Bush has shown little interest in environmental issues. "He has displayed no normative commitment to matters of the environment or international equity,' says Jeff Romm of the University of Berkeley, USA. There is a fear that he may dismantle the ‘environmental legacy' of the Clinton administration. "There will be a hardening of the US position on issues such as landuse and forest ‘sinks' and a stronger emphasis on flexibility mechanisms such as emissions trading,' says Ujjayant Chakravorty of Emory University, USA.
Bush has often said that he seeks further scientific evidence of climate change before pursuing significant policies. Since there is substantial scientific evidence, many interpret Bush's position as one of denial or ignorance. His environmental record in Texas is abysmally poor. When he was governor, the state led all others in total emissions, note analysts. Environmentalists point to an upward spike in ozone violations since Bush became governor in 1995. Data from the US Environment Protection Agency and the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission show there were 679 eight-hour ozone violations in Texas' eight major metropolitan areas in the 1995-99 period, up from 508 in 1990-94.
As for the negotiations associated with the Kyoto Protocol, Bush has said that he would not sign it in its present form, and many are sceptical if he will ever fully support a multilateral treaty that privileges ecological health over economic growth. Additionally, the US congress is on record saying that it will not ratify the protocol unless developing nations take on immediate commitments. This hamstrung the Clinton administration and will provide justification for foot-dragging by a Bush administration. "I think a Bush administration will drag its feet on climate change arguing that any significant movement on the issue will come at the expense of economic costs that he thinks the country is unwilling to endure,' says Paul Wapner of the American University. It would also mean a lower degree of enthusiasm for securing substantial funding for projects such as the clean development mechanisms (CDMs). The US private sector has shown interest in CDMs, as they stand to make a lot of money. They were disappointed that the CDMs did not materialise in the recently concluded climate talks at The Hague.
Speaking at a presidential debate at Wake Forest University on Oct 11, 2000, Bush said: "I'm not going to let the US carry the burden for cleaning up the world's air, like the Kyoto treaty would have done. China and India were exempted from that treaty.' He was only echoing what his father, former President George Bush, said at the Rio Summit in 1992, that the US "standard of living is not subject to negotiation.'
Therefore, a radical change in climate change policy is certainly not on the anvil.On the contrary, there may be a concerted effort to reduce the US dependence on foreign oil and increase drilling activity in the US. Incidentally, both Bush and vice president-elect Dick Cheney have been closely associated with oil companies in the past. The federal reserve economic models are heavily impacted by assumptions about oil prices, so whether it is a US $35 a barrel or US $22 barrel will make a significant difference on the US economy in the coming months. For Bush, US energy needs are about tapping more sources for oil. This is why he campaigned on opening up the Tongass Wildlife Refuge in Alaska for oil exploration. "He may try to drill for oil, but Democrats will be able to stop this as polls indicate popular opposition to such a policy,' feels Armin Rosencranz, professor at Stanford University, USA.
Some analysts believe that climate negotiators under a Bush administration cannot be much worse than the Clinton-Gore negotiators — both in terms of exploiting loopholes in the ‘trading' and ‘sinks' proposals and in violating US diplomatic commitments by insisting on developing country participation during the first round of the Kyoto protocol. "I would expect about the same level of intransigence from a Bush administration which will result only in intensifying the sense of diplomatic fatigue among the various delegations to the talks,' says Ross Gelbspan, author of The Heat Is On: The Climate Crisis, The Cover-Up, The Prescription .
One group that will benefit from the Bush presidency is the large US NGOs such as the Sierra Club and the World Wide Fund for Nature. "Their best days were when Reagan and Bush were in office. Since then their funding campaigns have gone down. They stand to gain once again,' feels Adil Najam, assistant professor at Boston University, USA.
Endangered Act!
The fate of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 also hangs in the balance. Over the past 25 years, the ESA has been a critical tool to protect species and habitats across the country. The Clinton administration worked hard in a defensive mode over the past few years to protect the Act from being gutted. Many members of the Republicans, however, tried consistently to undermine the Act's provisions. The Democrats were largely successful — although funds were cut that compromise full implementation of the Act — but it will be a much different situation with a Republican administration. "Bush will probably try to gut ESA, and anything remotely green,' warns Tom Athanasiou of EcoEquity, a non-governmental organisation based in California.
Bush may take power away from the federal government and place it in the hands of local governmental officials. This spells bad news for the ESA, as the act depends upon federal agencies to investigate petitions to place certain species on the endangered list and to oversee the implementation of regulations that actually protect species at risk. Some observers believe that Bush may not make a dent on the ESA within a four-year term. "A conservative Congress failed to undermine it, so a divided Congress is less likely to do so,' says Romm. He might, however, undertake strong efforts to share ESA responsibilities with the states. "That may be advantageous to some regions like the Pacific coast, but could destroy all hope in others like the Gulf states and Alaska,' Romm adds.
Another aspect of this is that Bush strongly believes in the rights of property owners to do what they want on their land. The ESA has provisions for reducing the choices landowners have for landuse and this Bush feels is ‘anti-American.' That is, private property is a sacred notion for Bush and it trumps federal environmental protection efforts.
Down to Earth, January 2001
AS GEORGE W BUSH heads for the White House, a wave of scepticism greets this former Texas governor. Bush arrives in Washington with a weak public mandate and a divided congress. What that will mean for the environment, is a question that is as riddled as the unending recounts and court cases that preceded his ‘victory'. One thing is certain: Bush will not be able to take a hardline stance on any issue, even if he wants to.
Judging from his past, Bush has shown little interest in environmental issues. "He has displayed no normative commitment to matters of the environment or international equity,' says Jeff Romm of the University of Berkeley, USA. There is a fear that he may dismantle the ‘environmental legacy' of the Clinton administration. "There will be a hardening of the US position on issues such as landuse and forest ‘sinks' and a stronger emphasis on flexibility mechanisms such as emissions trading,' says Ujjayant Chakravorty of Emory University, USA.
Bush has often said that he seeks further scientific evidence of climate change before pursuing significant policies. Since there is substantial scientific evidence, many interpret Bush's position as one of denial or ignorance. His environmental record in Texas is abysmally poor. When he was governor, the state led all others in total emissions, note analysts. Environmentalists point to an upward spike in ozone violations since Bush became governor in 1995. Data from the US Environment Protection Agency and the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission show there were 679 eight-hour ozone violations in Texas' eight major metropolitan areas in the 1995-99 period, up from 508 in 1990-94.
As for the negotiations associated with the Kyoto Protocol, Bush has said that he would not sign it in its present form, and many are sceptical if he will ever fully support a multilateral treaty that privileges ecological health over economic growth. Additionally, the US congress is on record saying that it will not ratify the protocol unless developing nations take on immediate commitments. This hamstrung the Clinton administration and will provide justification for foot-dragging by a Bush administration. "I think a Bush administration will drag its feet on climate change arguing that any significant movement on the issue will come at the expense of economic costs that he thinks the country is unwilling to endure,' says Paul Wapner of the American University. It would also mean a lower degree of enthusiasm for securing substantial funding for projects such as the clean development mechanisms (CDMs). The US private sector has shown interest in CDMs, as they stand to make a lot of money. They were disappointed that the CDMs did not materialise in the recently concluded climate talks at The Hague.
Speaking at a presidential debate at Wake Forest University on Oct 11, 2000, Bush said: "I'm not going to let the US carry the burden for cleaning up the world's air, like the Kyoto treaty would have done. China and India were exempted from that treaty.' He was only echoing what his father, former President George Bush, said at the Rio Summit in 1992, that the US "standard of living is not subject to negotiation.'
Therefore, a radical change in climate change policy is certainly not on the anvil.On the contrary, there may be a concerted effort to reduce the US dependence on foreign oil and increase drilling activity in the US. Incidentally, both Bush and vice president-elect Dick Cheney have been closely associated with oil companies in the past. The federal reserve economic models are heavily impacted by assumptions about oil prices, so whether it is a US $35 a barrel or US $22 barrel will make a significant difference on the US economy in the coming months. For Bush, US energy needs are about tapping more sources for oil. This is why he campaigned on opening up the Tongass Wildlife Refuge in Alaska for oil exploration. "He may try to drill for oil, but Democrats will be able to stop this as polls indicate popular opposition to such a policy,' feels Armin Rosencranz, professor at Stanford University, USA.
Some analysts believe that climate negotiators under a Bush administration cannot be much worse than the Clinton-Gore negotiators — both in terms of exploiting loopholes in the ‘trading' and ‘sinks' proposals and in violating US diplomatic commitments by insisting on developing country participation during the first round of the Kyoto protocol. "I would expect about the same level of intransigence from a Bush administration which will result only in intensifying the sense of diplomatic fatigue among the various delegations to the talks,' says Ross Gelbspan, author of The Heat Is On: The Climate Crisis, The Cover-Up, The Prescription .
One group that will benefit from the Bush presidency is the large US NGOs such as the Sierra Club and the World Wide Fund for Nature. "Their best days were when Reagan and Bush were in office. Since then their funding campaigns have gone down. They stand to gain once again,' feels Adil Najam, assistant professor at Boston University, USA.
Endangered Act!
The fate of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 also hangs in the balance. Over the past 25 years, the ESA has been a critical tool to protect species and habitats across the country. The Clinton administration worked hard in a defensive mode over the past few years to protect the Act from being gutted. Many members of the Republicans, however, tried consistently to undermine the Act's provisions. The Democrats were largely successful — although funds were cut that compromise full implementation of the Act — but it will be a much different situation with a Republican administration. "Bush will probably try to gut ESA, and anything remotely green,' warns Tom Athanasiou of EcoEquity, a non-governmental organisation based in California.
Bush may take power away from the federal government and place it in the hands of local governmental officials. This spells bad news for the ESA, as the act depends upon federal agencies to investigate petitions to place certain species on the endangered list and to oversee the implementation of regulations that actually protect species at risk. Some observers believe that Bush may not make a dent on the ESA within a four-year term. "A conservative Congress failed to undermine it, so a divided Congress is less likely to do so,' says Romm. He might, however, undertake strong efforts to share ESA responsibilities with the states. "That may be advantageous to some regions like the Pacific coast, but could destroy all hope in others like the Gulf states and Alaska,' Romm adds.
Another aspect of this is that Bush strongly believes in the rights of property owners to do what they want on their land. The ESA has provisions for reducing the choices landowners have for landuse and this Bush feels is ‘anti-American.' That is, private property is a sacred notion for Bush and it trumps federal environmental protection efforts.
Down to Earth, January 2001
SMALL TOWNS, BIG MESS
Something terrible is going on in India's small cities. There are warning signals from whatever data is available — and that is not much, as the Central Pollution Control Board is yet to publish data for 1997. The latest data would provide a more accurate picture of the present air quality status. Visits to a couple of small towns in India overwhelmingly point to a growing menace of air pollution. S S JEEVAN reports from Dehradun and Gajaraula
Dehradun
It is a sight which Suresh Rawat, a hotelier in the hill station of Mussourie that overlooks the town of Dehradun in Uttar Pradesh, could do without. Every winter, thick blue smoke envelops this town, casting a shadow on one of the most picturesque valleys in Asia. "Doon is a broad valley. This sometimes gives rise to a lateral inversion that does not allow hot air to rise from the valley. As a result the smoke settles over the valley," says Hugh Gantzer, resident of Mussourie and a member of a monitoring committee set up by the Supreme Court to restore the "natural normalcy of the Doon Valley".
Down in the valley, Tarun Pal, a resident of Dehradun, is wary of the first rains of the monsoon. "They leave scars on my car," he says. "I am sure that the rains here are acidic, although no studies have been conducted," says Anoop Kumar, editor of Doon City Chronicle, a local magazine.
Air pollution in Dehradun has been in the headlines for some time now. More than a decade ago it was limestone mining, but this was banned in 1986 by the Supreme Court in response to a public interest petition. "Although the SPM levels have shown a downward trend over the years, they are still above the prescribed limits at all the monitoring sites in Dehradun," says Shobha Chaturvedi, assistant scientific officer with the Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (UPPCB). In 1997, the city's annual average SPM level was more than twice the permissible limit and the maximum spm level was more than thrice the standard. Moreover, SPM levels were higher in residential areas compared to industrial areas.
Today, vehicular emissions are the main reason for air pollution. According to the road transport authority, only 10,000 vehicles were registered in Dehradun between 1937 and 1967. There are more than 126,452 vehicles plying on the roads at present, more than 100,000 of these are two-wheelers. However, the length and width of roads have increased only marginally. Result: traffic congestion. "Air pollution is concentrated in the middle of the town. The Saharanpur road, Gandhi road and the Railway station areas are the most polluted areas," says Kumar.
A study by the Dehradun-based People's Science Institute (PSI), a non-governmental organisation, says, "The abnormally high levels of SPM in Dehradun are mainly due to natural dust and particulate-laden smoke from diesel-fuelled vehicles, especially Vikrams, trucks, buses and three-wheelers." The impact on public health has been telling. PSI functionaries say the prevalence of respiratory diseases has risen alarmingly over the past decade and most cases are linked to air pollution. The institute conducted a study in which it selected a few plants and monitored the growth of their leaves at four sites in the town and one control site far away from the town. "We found that the growth of the bougainvillaea, lantana, litchi and mango was severely hampered by air pollution. However, some pollution-tolerant plants like jambolan (jamun) were not affected," says Anita Dutta of PSI.
"Vikrams are petrol-driven, but the replacement rate of petrol engines by diesel engines is about 99 per cent," Kumar says. Officially, about 2,050 Vikrams are registered in the town. "But there are several Vikrams registered in nearby towns like Saharanpur plying in Dehradun," says Ravi Chopra of PSI.
Another cause for concern are two-wheelers. "In the absence of a public transport system - and Vikrams being the only alternative - most middle-class people prefer scooters," says Gantzer. "There is also a class distinction attached with Vikrams. Most people prefer their own vehicles," adds Kumar. He points out that a survey conducted in the late 1980s revealed that on an average, each Dehradun family owned two vehicles. In some cases it was even three. "This number must have increased considerably by now," Kumar comments. Till a viable alternative is found to Vikrams, the sight that a tourist will behold from Mussourie, will not be a pleasant one.
GAJARAULA
There is no evidence more conclusive about the state of air pollution in Gajraula, a sleepy industrial town in Uttar Pradesh, than the air itself. As one enters the town, breathing becomes difficult. "The residents of the town have got used to the air quality. But visitors generally have difficulty in breathing," says an engineer who works in one of the polluting industrial units. CPCB data for 1997 show both the maximum and average levels of SPM way above the prescribed limit.
Gajraula was declared an industrial town in 1981-82. Within a few years, a number of industrial units - mainly chemical and pharmaceutical factories - sprung up. "After the setting up of these units, air pollution has increased at an alarming rate. We do not know what the pollution control board officials are doing. I am sure that these officials are fudging the data, because if an independent study is conducted, the figures would be higher," says Jitendra M Shukla, president, Nagrik Suraksha Samithi, a local organisation campaigning against industrial pollution.
A visit to the office of the Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (UPPCB) in Moradabad can be quite revealing. Although admitting that industrial units are polluting the air, the regional officer, R C Chowdary, says pollution is only to be expected in an industrial town. "The industrial units have installed pollution control equipment," he justifies. "We have all the requisite pollution control equipment," says Ajay Jain of J K Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Then why is the air polluted? "Poor enforcement," explains Shukla. Repeated visits by the Down To Earth reporter to the UPPCB monitoring station in the town proved futile as there was nobody at the office. CPCB officials in Delhi reveal that of the 20 large- and medium-scale industrial units in Gajraula, nine are classified as polluting.
The health of the residents is in jeopardy. There has been a steep rise in prevalence of asthma, respiratory problems and lung diseases after the industries have come up. Says N Mathur, superintendent of the government hospital in Gajraula: "Sixty-seventy per cent of my patients complain of respiratory problems. Cases of chronic lung problems are increasing. In 1985-86, I used to get an average 5-10 patients every month with respiratory problems. Now it is 30-40 patients," he says. Many of his patients are employed in the industrial units.
Cultivable land has undergone a change after the setting up of the industrial units. Mango, that was extensively cultivated here, has now been replaced by sugarcane and rice. "My mango trees were affected by air pollution from industrial units," says Tirath Ram, whose fields lie just outside the town, and who has now given up growing mango trees. Surely, if scientific studies are conducted on the state of air pollution in Gajraula, the results will be alarming. Till then, the town continues to suffer in silence.
(Down To Earth, Oct 1999)
Dehradun
It is a sight which Suresh Rawat, a hotelier in the hill station of Mussourie that overlooks the town of Dehradun in Uttar Pradesh, could do without. Every winter, thick blue smoke envelops this town, casting a shadow on one of the most picturesque valleys in Asia. "Doon is a broad valley. This sometimes gives rise to a lateral inversion that does not allow hot air to rise from the valley. As a result the smoke settles over the valley," says Hugh Gantzer, resident of Mussourie and a member of a monitoring committee set up by the Supreme Court to restore the "natural normalcy of the Doon Valley".
Down in the valley, Tarun Pal, a resident of Dehradun, is wary of the first rains of the monsoon. "They leave scars on my car," he says. "I am sure that the rains here are acidic, although no studies have been conducted," says Anoop Kumar, editor of Doon City Chronicle, a local magazine.
Air pollution in Dehradun has been in the headlines for some time now. More than a decade ago it was limestone mining, but this was banned in 1986 by the Supreme Court in response to a public interest petition. "Although the SPM levels have shown a downward trend over the years, they are still above the prescribed limits at all the monitoring sites in Dehradun," says Shobha Chaturvedi, assistant scientific officer with the Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (UPPCB). In 1997, the city's annual average SPM level was more than twice the permissible limit and the maximum spm level was more than thrice the standard. Moreover, SPM levels were higher in residential areas compared to industrial areas.
Today, vehicular emissions are the main reason for air pollution. According to the road transport authority, only 10,000 vehicles were registered in Dehradun between 1937 and 1967. There are more than 126,452 vehicles plying on the roads at present, more than 100,000 of these are two-wheelers. However, the length and width of roads have increased only marginally. Result: traffic congestion. "Air pollution is concentrated in the middle of the town. The Saharanpur road, Gandhi road and the Railway station areas are the most polluted areas," says Kumar.
A study by the Dehradun-based People's Science Institute (PSI), a non-governmental organisation, says, "The abnormally high levels of SPM in Dehradun are mainly due to natural dust and particulate-laden smoke from diesel-fuelled vehicles, especially Vikrams, trucks, buses and three-wheelers." The impact on public health has been telling. PSI functionaries say the prevalence of respiratory diseases has risen alarmingly over the past decade and most cases are linked to air pollution. The institute conducted a study in which it selected a few plants and monitored the growth of their leaves at four sites in the town and one control site far away from the town. "We found that the growth of the bougainvillaea, lantana, litchi and mango was severely hampered by air pollution. However, some pollution-tolerant plants like jambolan (jamun) were not affected," says Anita Dutta of PSI.
"Vikrams are petrol-driven, but the replacement rate of petrol engines by diesel engines is about 99 per cent," Kumar says. Officially, about 2,050 Vikrams are registered in the town. "But there are several Vikrams registered in nearby towns like Saharanpur plying in Dehradun," says Ravi Chopra of PSI.
Another cause for concern are two-wheelers. "In the absence of a public transport system - and Vikrams being the only alternative - most middle-class people prefer scooters," says Gantzer. "There is also a class distinction attached with Vikrams. Most people prefer their own vehicles," adds Kumar. He points out that a survey conducted in the late 1980s revealed that on an average, each Dehradun family owned two vehicles. In some cases it was even three. "This number must have increased considerably by now," Kumar comments. Till a viable alternative is found to Vikrams, the sight that a tourist will behold from Mussourie, will not be a pleasant one.
GAJARAULA
There is no evidence more conclusive about the state of air pollution in Gajraula, a sleepy industrial town in Uttar Pradesh, than the air itself. As one enters the town, breathing becomes difficult. "The residents of the town have got used to the air quality. But visitors generally have difficulty in breathing," says an engineer who works in one of the polluting industrial units. CPCB data for 1997 show both the maximum and average levels of SPM way above the prescribed limit.
Gajraula was declared an industrial town in 1981-82. Within a few years, a number of industrial units - mainly chemical and pharmaceutical factories - sprung up. "After the setting up of these units, air pollution has increased at an alarming rate. We do not know what the pollution control board officials are doing. I am sure that these officials are fudging the data, because if an independent study is conducted, the figures would be higher," says Jitendra M Shukla, president, Nagrik Suraksha Samithi, a local organisation campaigning against industrial pollution.
A visit to the office of the Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (UPPCB) in Moradabad can be quite revealing. Although admitting that industrial units are polluting the air, the regional officer, R C Chowdary, says pollution is only to be expected in an industrial town. "The industrial units have installed pollution control equipment," he justifies. "We have all the requisite pollution control equipment," says Ajay Jain of J K Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Then why is the air polluted? "Poor enforcement," explains Shukla. Repeated visits by the Down To Earth reporter to the UPPCB monitoring station in the town proved futile as there was nobody at the office. CPCB officials in Delhi reveal that of the 20 large- and medium-scale industrial units in Gajraula, nine are classified as polluting.
The health of the residents is in jeopardy. There has been a steep rise in prevalence of asthma, respiratory problems and lung diseases after the industries have come up. Says N Mathur, superintendent of the government hospital in Gajraula: "Sixty-seventy per cent of my patients complain of respiratory problems. Cases of chronic lung problems are increasing. In 1985-86, I used to get an average 5-10 patients every month with respiratory problems. Now it is 30-40 patients," he says. Many of his patients are employed in the industrial units.
Cultivable land has undergone a change after the setting up of the industrial units. Mango, that was extensively cultivated here, has now been replaced by sugarcane and rice. "My mango trees were affected by air pollution from industrial units," says Tirath Ram, whose fields lie just outside the town, and who has now given up growing mango trees. Surely, if scientific studies are conducted on the state of air pollution in Gajraula, the results will be alarming. Till then, the town continues to suffer in silence.
(Down To Earth, Oct 1999)
WTO: DOHA ROUND
Neither a Victory for the North, Nor a Loss for the South
By Anju Sharma with S S Jeevan
The choice of venue was clever and the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center added to the security paranoia. The result was that it combined to give trade negotiators somewhat of a breather when they met in Doha, Qatar, for the fourth ministerial conference of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The massive street protests that marked the Seattle round were non-existent at the Doha ministerial. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the US, anti-globalisation protesters were suddenly disoriented, and several plans for protests at Doha were cancelled. "Are we talking about anti-capitalisation, anti-globalisation or anti-Americanism? It didn’t matter before September 11; now it does," says Tom Spencer, director of the European Centre for Public Affairs.
Besides, the organisers were not taking any chances, and the conference venue looked like a fortress. The perceived threat of terrorism was used as an effective way of stopping anyone opposed to the WTO — out of sight, and perhaps out of mind.
With the debacle of Seattle looming large, the negotiators were under pressure to come up with results. And at the end of the six-day marathon meeting, a deal was struck. It was agreed to start negotiations on a new trade round to culminate in 2005. For the North, which was keen to bring issues of investment and competition into global trade negotiations, it was a "given". Most importantly, they got an agreement for a new round of negotiations. The South lost most battles, but was relieved to still be in the reckoning. Most gains were in the backroom "bilateral deals" — a euphemism for arm-twisting.
Give and take!
The biggest gain for developing countries was on patents and drugs. Countries were granted the right to break the monopoly over patented drugs in case of health emergencies like epidemics. Analysts feel that the issue was clinched only due to the US’ predicament over anthrax drugs. But the drug industry has dismissed Doha as a political statement and not legally binding. The European Union (EU) brought an agreement within reach by making a concession on agricultural subsidies. It agreed to "reductions, with the view to phasing out", of agricultural export subsidies — something it had always resisted. However, a qualifying phrase was included in the agreement, which said the EU’s concession was made "without prejudging the outcome of the (final) negotiations". "It was clear from the very beginning that we have to give and to take also something," said European agriculture commissioner, Franz Fischler. In return, WTO members accepted EU demands that investment, competition and environment rules be put on the agenda.
The US agreed to relax some import curbs. And it got an assurance on the anti-dumping issue. The US has given assurance of greater discipline in imposition of anti-dumping provisions. But on the issue of greatest concern to the South, textiles, the US refused to advance the deadline for quota reduction from January 2005. It has, in fact, threatened to impose non-tariff barriers on other imports if pushed.
In return for the concessions made by the EU, negotiators wanted stronger language on trade and protecting the environment. Developing countries, however, did not want the environment to be linked to trade rules. They felt that environmental concerns would be used as an excuse for renewed protectionism. For now, the issue has been put on the backburner. The EU has won the right to talks within two years on how to improve the investment climate for international companies abroad, and how to introduce competition policy into trade law.
The Indian act: deal breaker
India made all the right noises at the meeting, but came back with very little. Indian commerce and industry minister Murasoli Maran, who called WTO "a necessary evil", was seen as the champion of developing countries. He was also the biggest stumbling block during negotiations. India, which has just a share of 0.7 per cent of world trade, was wary that a clause on competition would allow foreign companies too much freedom to operate in the country. India’s intransigence led to the extension of the conference by a day. Till the last day, the minister seemed to block a declaration. In an effort to reach an agreement, many trade ministers held several closed-door meetings with Maran. But nothing worked. Media reports suggest that the issue was clinched only when the Qatari chief negotiator Yousef Hussein Kamal held a one-to-one meeting with the minister. That meeting changed everything. India finally fell in line. What transpired at that meeting, however, remains unknown.
Maran is being showered with encomiums for holding his ground at Doha. In reality, he has only bought more time with regards to issues such as investment and competition. The delay is being seen as a victory — typical of Indian bureaucracy’s shortsightedness. The strategy is to block a proposal without proposing a new one. But as countries tighten the noose in the forthcoming negotiations, India will be forced to accept what it fought all the while.
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
Can green mean free? The debate reached a boiling point in Doha, but remained inconclusive
Midway through the Doha meeting, EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy visited Rainbow Warrior, the mascot ship of the international environment activist organisation Greenpeace, anchored in the Qatari seawaters. "Some balance between the trade rules and environmental protection is to be struck, that is why we are here," Lamy said on board his high-visibility platform. The gesture might have struck a chord back home in Europe, but most countries from either side of the economic divide did not agree.
The EU had made it abundantly clear even before the ministerial that inclusion of environmental concerns was in effect a sine qua non for the EU’s agreement to ambitious negotiations on cutting back state supports for agriculture. The EU move is perceived as a means to retain some green barriers to its agriculture markets when its agricultural subsidies are eventually phased out as envisaged in the Doha declaration. It is pushing for recognition of the ‘multifunctionality of agriculture’. Under this concept, agriculture does not just serve the purpose of providing food but also helps in maintaining rural communities, protect the environment if non-intensive methods are used, preserve culture and promote sustainable development. This possible connection between agriculture and environment is seen as one of the reasons why the EU is pushing environment at the WTO.
The South opposes bringing the issues related to environmental protection into the mainstream of multilateral trade talks, saying their potential abuse as green protectionism cannot be ruled out. In the past, the demands for linkages between trade and environment have come not only from Northern non-governmental organisations (NGOS), but also from Northern industry and labour unions, which stand to benefit if environmental standards are applied to trade.
Developing countries also fear the huge costs associated with greener technologies, which will be unbearable by their domestic industries. It could make their goods uncompetitive in western markets. This unequivocal opposition to greening of trade is what brings the motley crew of poor countries together. "If there’s one thing that unites developing countries, it is opposition to negotiations on trade and environment," said a developing country official before the meeting. "If the EU says it’s a deal-breaker, so be it. There are just too many people against it." The Republican Bush administration shares these views (unlike the democrats), and would rather the green issues remain outside the purview of the WTO, as they could harm the interests of US industry. For instance, US biotechnology firms stand to lose out, due to the wariness against genetically modified (GM) food.
Despite this opposition, the EU threat that it would negotiate on liberalising agricultural trade only if other WTO members agree to talk on trade and environment, eventually worked. The final ministerial declaration controversially proposes negotiations to enhance "mutual supportiveness of trade and environment". The declaration reiterates the EU demand seeking clarification on the relationship between the WTO rules and "trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAS)" instructs the WTO’s committee on trade and environment (CTE) to give special attention to, among other things, ecolabelling suggests reduction and even elimination of trade barriers to environmental goods and services, a move that has been mutely welcomed by developing nations seeks to further strengthening the links between trade and environment by proposing negotiations on "procedures for regular information exchange" between the relevant MEA bodies and their counterparts in the WTO.
Indian industry minister Murasoli Maran dismissed the environment provisions in the declaration as "the price we have to pay for something in agriculture". "We have marginally agreed on environment, which to a large extent, is a political acknowledgement of its importance rather than rebalancing of rights and obligations," he said.
The environmental measures listed in the Doha declaration are not new. They have been part of the discussions at the CTE for several years now, and have been discussed in by the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism before that. CTE was set up in 1995 and is composed of all WTO members and a number of observers from inter-governmental organizations. It functions with the understanding that "it does not modify the rights and obligations of any WTO member under the WTO agreements." A ten-point agenda forms the basis of the committee’s work, which includes decisions on environment measures for trade, ecolabelling, environmentally unfriendly subsidies and intellectual property rights.
CTE has not reached any conclusions due to the controversial nature of the issues. In 1996, it presented an inconclusive report at the Singapore ministerial due to the fact that its members had failed to reach agreements on most of the issues under discussion. The ministerial made note of the "the breadth and complexity of the issues covered by the committee" and "further work needs to be undertaken on all items of its agenda". The committee was directed to carry on its work.
Although CTE discussions have been unfruitful, the trade and environment debate is being addressed in other fora. As the pressure from Northern civil society to take on board environmental concerns increases, the dispute settlement mechanism has come out more and more in support of green issues. In a recent ruling on the shrimp-turtle case, a WTO appellate body (AB) endorses a US ban on shrimp imports from countries that do not use turtle excluder devices to prevent harming sea turtles (see box: In through the backdoor). These judgments cannot be taken lightly, since they are making law by setting precedents.
In October 2001, an appellate body set up under the WTO ruled that the US was justified in banning shrimp exports from countries that do not use ‘turtle excluder devices’ (TEDs) to prevent sea turtle mortalities while catching shrimp. Through this ruling, the WTO has endorsed unilateral, extrajurisdictional action by nations. Moreover, it has endorsed discrimination between products based on their process and production methods (PPM).
The shrimp-turtle issue goes back to 1996, when the US banned shrimp imports from countries that did not use TEDs. India, Malaysia, Thailand and Pakistan took the matter to the WTO, contending that the US was trying to dictate the environment policy to be followed by other countries, and imposing its unilateral decision on other countries. They said the US ban amounted to disguised protectionism.
In 1998, the WTO dispute settlement panel (DSP) dismissed the US ban on grounds that it was discriminating among the exporters. The DSP stated that the US action was arbitrary and inconsistent with article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which does not allow WTO members to impose import restrictions. Although the ruling did not go to the extent of rubbishing the unilateral nature of the US ban, the WTO’s dispute settlement body won new respect amongst developing countries for this ruling.
But in response to a US appeal, a WTO appellate body (AB) partially overruled the DSP ruling. The AB ruled that the US law did not violate the WTO obligations and was covered under an exception to the GATT (article XX (g)) rules for measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. However, the AB felt that the US ban resulted in unfair discrimination between exporting nations, since the process of certification was to be decided by the US agencies alone. Hence there was a lack of transparency and participation in the process. Also, the US guidelines gave exporting countries little time to implement the mandatory use of TEDs. In August 1998, the US changed its guidelines to accommodate the WTO ruling. Instead of an outright ban on shrimp exports from the four countries, it made certification that TEDs were used essential on a shipment-to-shipment basis.
Malaysia and India were not satisfied with these changes, and wanted a complete lifting of the shrimp import restriction. Malaysia filed a complaint in late 2000, and sought a review of the whole issue and requested the re-establishment of the original panel to examine whether the US had, in fact, complied with the appellate body findings. A compliance panel, set up to look into the case, in May 2001 ruled in favour of the US, concluding that the US was not obliged to lift its import ban to implement the 1998 appellate body report, which requested the US to bring its import ban into conformity with WTO trade rules.
The latest ruling indicates that the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism is giving in to pressure from environmental groups, and protests by Southern governments to keep environmental concerns out of the trade agenda may eventually prove futile. Morevover, as the EU faces pressure from its civil society on the issue of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), the Union is unlikely to let go of issues such as the primacy of public health, the precautionary principle, and process and production methods (PPMS).
In June 2000, seven months after non-governmental organisations demanded that the WTO look beyond trade concerns at the doomed Seattle ministerial, a WTO dispute settlement panel (DSP) ruled in favour of public health and against free trade for the first time, in a case involving Canadian asbestos exports. WTO representatives lost no time in announcing that the decision "disproves charges by radical environmental and human rights bodies that the organisation works in favour of big business by giving free trade interests preference over other concerns".
Canada is the world’s largest exporter of chrysotile (white) asbestos — in 1999 alone, its four mines based in French-speaking Quebec produced 345,000 tonnes of chrysotile, worth roughly US $110 million. But health concerns lead several European countries to ban the import and use of this material in many countries that had, until then, been strong import allies. The World Health Organisation (WHO) lists asbestos fibres as carcinogenic. France was the first among the EU countries to implement such a ban, starting in January 1997. Other EU nations followed, and as of late 2000, most EU member states, excluding Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg, had similar bans in place.
Canada filed a complaint with the WTO against the French ban in May 1998. A dispute settlement panel (DSP) was set up in November 1998. The DSP first decided that imported Canadian asbestos and domestically produced substitutes (polyvinyl alcohol or PVA, cellulose and glass) are ‘like-products’, since they are similar in properties, nature and quality and had similar end-uses. Therefore, the panel first decided that the ban was not a question of health, but rather a question of GATT article III on national treatment, or equal treatment of foreign products and their domestic equivalents. Following the DSP’s ruling that asbestos was indeed a ‘like product’, France was required to justify its ‘violation’ through article XX (b), which allows for specific general exceptions to the WTO rules, in support of health and environment. In September 2000, the DSP ruled in favor of France, setting a new precedent by allowing a WTO member to use article XX (b) to impose trade measures for the first time. Canada decided to appeal, but the WTO’s appellate body (AB) ruled again in March 2001, to once again uphold the decision in France’s favour.
This case could also have an impact on interpretations of the scope of the agreement on technical barriers to trade (TBT), which explicitly rules against discrimination of final products based on the process of their production. Canada had asserted that France’s ban on asbestos was effectively a regulation of the characteristics and process of production, while the European Community (EC), representing France, asserted that the ban was not. The DSP agreed with France, and ruled that the French ban was not based on the characteristics and process of production, and thus not covered by the TBT agreement. The AB reversed this finding, taking the view that product characteristics could be presented in a positive or negative light.
In this case, France had specified that imports shall not contain asbestos fibres. "The effect of this ruling is that countries can circumvent a product and production method (PPM) analysis, at least as it relates to goods containing a banned product, by simply outlawing the hazardous substance as a whole," says London-based trade and environment analyst Kevin Gray.
Developing country concerns over green protectionism are legitimate, but they cannot simply continue to oppose negotiations on the links between trade and environment — they have to take them head on to make sure their concerns are addressed through legitimate multilateral negotiations, rather than through the back door, by a few people on a dispute settlement panel or appellate body.
Conflict with environment treaties
For instance, the discussion on the relationship between trade rules and MEAS has been uneasy to say the least. While the WTO currently allows importing countries the freedom to choose their own standards in the interests of public health and the environment in their own countries, they are not allowed to impose standards aimed at improving health or environmental practices of exporting countries. But can environmental standards be imposed on another country if a multilateral treaty has been signed to this effect? The EU considers it necessary to ensure that when there is dispute concerning environment-related trade measures, linkages between trade and environment are taken into account so that one does not jeopardise the fulfillment of the other.
Developing countries see the debate on MEAS as a non-trade issue, but it is in fact in their interests to sort out the issue once and for all, rather than leave the issues open for interpretation by the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. Several feasible options have been suggested in the past, such as moving environment-trade conflicts to tribunals provided specifically under MEAS; or moving such disputes to the International Court of Justice. But even before agreeing to a venue, developing countries must insist on clarification on a set of overarching rules. For instance, they should insist on a provision that forbids the use of trade sanctions to conserve the global environment, since such sanctions can only be used by the more economically powerful nations against the less economically powerful. Extra-jurisdictional and unilateral action should not be possible even within a multilateral agreement.
Northern green activists were not entirely happy with the outcome at Doha, though for reasons other than those troubling developing countries. The declaration states that negotiations on the relationship between trade and MEAS shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a party to the MEA in question. Greenpeace fears that this phrase would prove a powerful disincentive for countries to sign the MEAS. The declaration also states that negotiations on the effect of environmental measures on market access and the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) accord shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of Members under existing WTO agreements. These environmental activists feel that the final outcome of the negotiations on these points could end up as footnotes rather than effect any change in the WTO rules.
Marks of shame?
Ecolabelling started out as a consumer awareness aid to help them make better choices. The EU penchant for ecolabelling was on full display in all the pre-Doha drafts. Ecolabelling is a way to ensure that all exports are harmless to humans and the environment — in itself a rational and benign idea. However, its practice could erect new insurmountable barriers to exports from the poorer countries.
Ecolabelling requires that products be marked environmentally friendly not just because they do not directly harm the environment but also indirectly. At the centre of the debate is the ppm criterion which looks at the environmental-friendliness of the technologies used to make a product rather than the superficially judge the product, the final outcome of the process. Life cycle criterion is another specification applied for ecolabelling. This looks at the ppm, the product and how the product will be eventually disposed, making ecolabelling an even more stringent requirement. This has raised hackles in the developing world where state-of-the-art green technologies are seldom considered for their prohibitive costs. Insisting on ppm for labelling would bar most of poorer countries’ exports from the northern markets. At the moment this agenda has only been put on a fast track, but it is not for negotiations.
Pragmatic investment
Developing countries must try and use global investment rules for their benefit
Attempts by a few developing countries, including India and Malaysia, to keep investment out of the Doha declaration failed. The declaration calls for ‘clarifying elements’ of a possible multilateral investment framework, and recognises the need for a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment, particularly foreign investment that will contribute to the expansion of trade. A decision will be taken at the next ministerial conference on modalities of negotiations in this area.
Addressing a press conference in India after the Doha conference, minister for commerce and industry Murasoli Maran took solace in the fact that "nothing would happen immediately" and the negotiations would take their time "during which we have to be watchful". But rather than simply saying and then hoping that nothing will happen, the Indian government would do better to start thinking about what they would like out an investment treaty, which now seems inevitable. Otherwise, they will find themselves at a disadvantage, as industrialised countries jump a readymade pro-industry model such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on them. NAFTA gives foreign investors the right to sue host governments, which do not have the right to appeal once a decision has been reached. Such a multilateral framework can have deep repercussions for developing countries.
Civil society around the world has also been wary of attempts to establish global multilateral investment rules since the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) tried to secretly negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) that would vest MNCs with the power to question the decisions of national governments. These groups, based mostly in Europe and Canada, opposed the OECD MAI draft, but many believed that global multilateral investment rules were needed to stop the exploitation of developing countries through poorly negotiated bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of BITs signed from 385 at the end of the 1980s to 1,857 at the end of the 1990s. Often, BITs do not reflect a balance between the desire of developing country governments to attract FDI, and their domestic developmental concerns. At a meeting on foreign investments and their development dimensions organised by UNCTAD in 1997, some developing country governments considered themselves ill equipped to draw up balanced BITS, given the unequal bargaining power between industrialised and developing countries. Some contend that a global set of established guidelines could ensure the parameters of accountability, social and environmental responsibility. Others disagree.
In any multilateral negotiation on investment, industrialised countries will hold the aces, and are likely to have an inherent bias towards protecting the best interests of their companies, while developing countries will continue to play the role of desperate investment-seekers. There are no precedents to indicate that developing countries can expect anything but an unfair deal out of such an arrangement, particularly if the negotiations are conducted under the already biased WTO. Therefore, while an overreaching investments agreement may help developing countries out of having to compete with each other for investment, they will have to take care to ensure that the negotiations take place at a forum that is capable of taking on their development concerns.
Precautionary principle
The EU locked horns with the US by banning American beef exports on the ground that the beef was laced hormones that could cause cancer and other health problems. The ban was not upheld by the WTO because it was not convinced with the scientific evidence the EU had provided to prove its case and that it was imposing its higher standards on health and food safety on others. The EU insisted that it was acting according to the precautionary principle. This better-safe-than-sorry principle lets a country take a similar action like the one the EU took even in the absence of supporting scientific rationale.
The WTO had judged the case by the 1996 agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), which favoured a more scientifically demanding risk assessment to the precautionary principle. The US also proved that its beef hormones met standards set by Codex Alimentarius Commission, a world body that develops standards for food additives, pesticides, chemicals and contaminants. The precautionary principle has since become pet issue that the EU pushes in every WTO meeting. Doha was no exception. On the fourth day of the talks the EU broached the subject, but intense opposition kept it out of the final declaration.
At the insistence of the Philippines, the US and Iceland the Doha text pushes for negotiations on clarifying and improving WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies. Fisheries subsidies have been seen as a major cause for the depletion of fish stocks due to overfishing. Apart from the environmental impact the subsidies-caused depletion also undermines the livelihood of those dependant on fishing. This is particularly the case in many developing countries as the text also points out.
Though fisheries subsidies have figured in the WTO debates and in its predecessor GATT, no agreement was earmarked to cover the issue during the Uruguay Round. At the Seattle 1999 meeting a proposal was made to tackle environmentally harmful and trade-distorting fisheries subsidies but disagreements over which WTO body should cover the subject halted progress. The EU is one of the leading providers of subsidies to its fishermen and hence has been shying from bringing the issue into WTO forum. The presence of the subject vindicates the view that much give and take has transpired to prevent Doha ending up as a disaster.
(Down to Earth, December 15, 2001)
By Anju Sharma with S S Jeevan
The choice of venue was clever and the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center added to the security paranoia. The result was that it combined to give trade negotiators somewhat of a breather when they met in Doha, Qatar, for the fourth ministerial conference of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The massive street protests that marked the Seattle round were non-existent at the Doha ministerial. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the US, anti-globalisation protesters were suddenly disoriented, and several plans for protests at Doha were cancelled. "Are we talking about anti-capitalisation, anti-globalisation or anti-Americanism? It didn’t matter before September 11; now it does," says Tom Spencer, director of the European Centre for Public Affairs.
Besides, the organisers were not taking any chances, and the conference venue looked like a fortress. The perceived threat of terrorism was used as an effective way of stopping anyone opposed to the WTO — out of sight, and perhaps out of mind.
With the debacle of Seattle looming large, the negotiators were under pressure to come up with results. And at the end of the six-day marathon meeting, a deal was struck. It was agreed to start negotiations on a new trade round to culminate in 2005. For the North, which was keen to bring issues of investment and competition into global trade negotiations, it was a "given". Most importantly, they got an agreement for a new round of negotiations. The South lost most battles, but was relieved to still be in the reckoning. Most gains were in the backroom "bilateral deals" — a euphemism for arm-twisting.
Give and take!
The biggest gain for developing countries was on patents and drugs. Countries were granted the right to break the monopoly over patented drugs in case of health emergencies like epidemics. Analysts feel that the issue was clinched only due to the US’ predicament over anthrax drugs. But the drug industry has dismissed Doha as a political statement and not legally binding. The European Union (EU) brought an agreement within reach by making a concession on agricultural subsidies. It agreed to "reductions, with the view to phasing out", of agricultural export subsidies — something it had always resisted. However, a qualifying phrase was included in the agreement, which said the EU’s concession was made "without prejudging the outcome of the (final) negotiations". "It was clear from the very beginning that we have to give and to take also something," said European agriculture commissioner, Franz Fischler. In return, WTO members accepted EU demands that investment, competition and environment rules be put on the agenda.
The US agreed to relax some import curbs. And it got an assurance on the anti-dumping issue. The US has given assurance of greater discipline in imposition of anti-dumping provisions. But on the issue of greatest concern to the South, textiles, the US refused to advance the deadline for quota reduction from January 2005. It has, in fact, threatened to impose non-tariff barriers on other imports if pushed.
In return for the concessions made by the EU, negotiators wanted stronger language on trade and protecting the environment. Developing countries, however, did not want the environment to be linked to trade rules. They felt that environmental concerns would be used as an excuse for renewed protectionism. For now, the issue has been put on the backburner. The EU has won the right to talks within two years on how to improve the investment climate for international companies abroad, and how to introduce competition policy into trade law.
The Indian act: deal breaker
India made all the right noises at the meeting, but came back with very little. Indian commerce and industry minister Murasoli Maran, who called WTO "a necessary evil", was seen as the champion of developing countries. He was also the biggest stumbling block during negotiations. India, which has just a share of 0.7 per cent of world trade, was wary that a clause on competition would allow foreign companies too much freedom to operate in the country. India’s intransigence led to the extension of the conference by a day. Till the last day, the minister seemed to block a declaration. In an effort to reach an agreement, many trade ministers held several closed-door meetings with Maran. But nothing worked. Media reports suggest that the issue was clinched only when the Qatari chief negotiator Yousef Hussein Kamal held a one-to-one meeting with the minister. That meeting changed everything. India finally fell in line. What transpired at that meeting, however, remains unknown.
Maran is being showered with encomiums for holding his ground at Doha. In reality, he has only bought more time with regards to issues such as investment and competition. The delay is being seen as a victory — typical of Indian bureaucracy’s shortsightedness. The strategy is to block a proposal without proposing a new one. But as countries tighten the noose in the forthcoming negotiations, India will be forced to accept what it fought all the while.
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
Can green mean free? The debate reached a boiling point in Doha, but remained inconclusive
Midway through the Doha meeting, EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy visited Rainbow Warrior, the mascot ship of the international environment activist organisation Greenpeace, anchored in the Qatari seawaters. "Some balance between the trade rules and environmental protection is to be struck, that is why we are here," Lamy said on board his high-visibility platform. The gesture might have struck a chord back home in Europe, but most countries from either side of the economic divide did not agree.
The EU had made it abundantly clear even before the ministerial that inclusion of environmental concerns was in effect a sine qua non for the EU’s agreement to ambitious negotiations on cutting back state supports for agriculture. The EU move is perceived as a means to retain some green barriers to its agriculture markets when its agricultural subsidies are eventually phased out as envisaged in the Doha declaration. It is pushing for recognition of the ‘multifunctionality of agriculture’. Under this concept, agriculture does not just serve the purpose of providing food but also helps in maintaining rural communities, protect the environment if non-intensive methods are used, preserve culture and promote sustainable development. This possible connection between agriculture and environment is seen as one of the reasons why the EU is pushing environment at the WTO.
The South opposes bringing the issues related to environmental protection into the mainstream of multilateral trade talks, saying their potential abuse as green protectionism cannot be ruled out. In the past, the demands for linkages between trade and environment have come not only from Northern non-governmental organisations (NGOS), but also from Northern industry and labour unions, which stand to benefit if environmental standards are applied to trade.
Developing countries also fear the huge costs associated with greener technologies, which will be unbearable by their domestic industries. It could make their goods uncompetitive in western markets. This unequivocal opposition to greening of trade is what brings the motley crew of poor countries together. "If there’s one thing that unites developing countries, it is opposition to negotiations on trade and environment," said a developing country official before the meeting. "If the EU says it’s a deal-breaker, so be it. There are just too many people against it." The Republican Bush administration shares these views (unlike the democrats), and would rather the green issues remain outside the purview of the WTO, as they could harm the interests of US industry. For instance, US biotechnology firms stand to lose out, due to the wariness against genetically modified (GM) food.
Despite this opposition, the EU threat that it would negotiate on liberalising agricultural trade only if other WTO members agree to talk on trade and environment, eventually worked. The final ministerial declaration controversially proposes negotiations to enhance "mutual supportiveness of trade and environment". The declaration reiterates the EU demand seeking clarification on the relationship between the WTO rules and "trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAS)" instructs the WTO’s committee on trade and environment (CTE) to give special attention to, among other things, ecolabelling suggests reduction and even elimination of trade barriers to environmental goods and services, a move that has been mutely welcomed by developing nations seeks to further strengthening the links between trade and environment by proposing negotiations on "procedures for regular information exchange" between the relevant MEA bodies and their counterparts in the WTO.
Indian industry minister Murasoli Maran dismissed the environment provisions in the declaration as "the price we have to pay for something in agriculture". "We have marginally agreed on environment, which to a large extent, is a political acknowledgement of its importance rather than rebalancing of rights and obligations," he said.
The environmental measures listed in the Doha declaration are not new. They have been part of the discussions at the CTE for several years now, and have been discussed in by the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism before that. CTE was set up in 1995 and is composed of all WTO members and a number of observers from inter-governmental organizations. It functions with the understanding that "it does not modify the rights and obligations of any WTO member under the WTO agreements." A ten-point agenda forms the basis of the committee’s work, which includes decisions on environment measures for trade, ecolabelling, environmentally unfriendly subsidies and intellectual property rights.
CTE has not reached any conclusions due to the controversial nature of the issues. In 1996, it presented an inconclusive report at the Singapore ministerial due to the fact that its members had failed to reach agreements on most of the issues under discussion. The ministerial made note of the "the breadth and complexity of the issues covered by the committee" and "further work needs to be undertaken on all items of its agenda". The committee was directed to carry on its work.
Although CTE discussions have been unfruitful, the trade and environment debate is being addressed in other fora. As the pressure from Northern civil society to take on board environmental concerns increases, the dispute settlement mechanism has come out more and more in support of green issues. In a recent ruling on the shrimp-turtle case, a WTO appellate body (AB) endorses a US ban on shrimp imports from countries that do not use turtle excluder devices to prevent harming sea turtles (see box: In through the backdoor). These judgments cannot be taken lightly, since they are making law by setting precedents.
In October 2001, an appellate body set up under the WTO ruled that the US was justified in banning shrimp exports from countries that do not use ‘turtle excluder devices’ (TEDs) to prevent sea turtle mortalities while catching shrimp. Through this ruling, the WTO has endorsed unilateral, extrajurisdictional action by nations. Moreover, it has endorsed discrimination between products based on their process and production methods (PPM).
The shrimp-turtle issue goes back to 1996, when the US banned shrimp imports from countries that did not use TEDs. India, Malaysia, Thailand and Pakistan took the matter to the WTO, contending that the US was trying to dictate the environment policy to be followed by other countries, and imposing its unilateral decision on other countries. They said the US ban amounted to disguised protectionism.
In 1998, the WTO dispute settlement panel (DSP) dismissed the US ban on grounds that it was discriminating among the exporters. The DSP stated that the US action was arbitrary and inconsistent with article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which does not allow WTO members to impose import restrictions. Although the ruling did not go to the extent of rubbishing the unilateral nature of the US ban, the WTO’s dispute settlement body won new respect amongst developing countries for this ruling.
But in response to a US appeal, a WTO appellate body (AB) partially overruled the DSP ruling. The AB ruled that the US law did not violate the WTO obligations and was covered under an exception to the GATT (article XX (g)) rules for measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. However, the AB felt that the US ban resulted in unfair discrimination between exporting nations, since the process of certification was to be decided by the US agencies alone. Hence there was a lack of transparency and participation in the process. Also, the US guidelines gave exporting countries little time to implement the mandatory use of TEDs. In August 1998, the US changed its guidelines to accommodate the WTO ruling. Instead of an outright ban on shrimp exports from the four countries, it made certification that TEDs were used essential on a shipment-to-shipment basis.
Malaysia and India were not satisfied with these changes, and wanted a complete lifting of the shrimp import restriction. Malaysia filed a complaint in late 2000, and sought a review of the whole issue and requested the re-establishment of the original panel to examine whether the US had, in fact, complied with the appellate body findings. A compliance panel, set up to look into the case, in May 2001 ruled in favour of the US, concluding that the US was not obliged to lift its import ban to implement the 1998 appellate body report, which requested the US to bring its import ban into conformity with WTO trade rules.
The latest ruling indicates that the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism is giving in to pressure from environmental groups, and protests by Southern governments to keep environmental concerns out of the trade agenda may eventually prove futile. Morevover, as the EU faces pressure from its civil society on the issue of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), the Union is unlikely to let go of issues such as the primacy of public health, the precautionary principle, and process and production methods (PPMS).
In June 2000, seven months after non-governmental organisations demanded that the WTO look beyond trade concerns at the doomed Seattle ministerial, a WTO dispute settlement panel (DSP) ruled in favour of public health and against free trade for the first time, in a case involving Canadian asbestos exports. WTO representatives lost no time in announcing that the decision "disproves charges by radical environmental and human rights bodies that the organisation works in favour of big business by giving free trade interests preference over other concerns".
Canada is the world’s largest exporter of chrysotile (white) asbestos — in 1999 alone, its four mines based in French-speaking Quebec produced 345,000 tonnes of chrysotile, worth roughly US $110 million. But health concerns lead several European countries to ban the import and use of this material in many countries that had, until then, been strong import allies. The World Health Organisation (WHO) lists asbestos fibres as carcinogenic. France was the first among the EU countries to implement such a ban, starting in January 1997. Other EU nations followed, and as of late 2000, most EU member states, excluding Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg, had similar bans in place.
Canada filed a complaint with the WTO against the French ban in May 1998. A dispute settlement panel (DSP) was set up in November 1998. The DSP first decided that imported Canadian asbestos and domestically produced substitutes (polyvinyl alcohol or PVA, cellulose and glass) are ‘like-products’, since they are similar in properties, nature and quality and had similar end-uses. Therefore, the panel first decided that the ban was not a question of health, but rather a question of GATT article III on national treatment, or equal treatment of foreign products and their domestic equivalents. Following the DSP’s ruling that asbestos was indeed a ‘like product’, France was required to justify its ‘violation’ through article XX (b), which allows for specific general exceptions to the WTO rules, in support of health and environment. In September 2000, the DSP ruled in favor of France, setting a new precedent by allowing a WTO member to use article XX (b) to impose trade measures for the first time. Canada decided to appeal, but the WTO’s appellate body (AB) ruled again in March 2001, to once again uphold the decision in France’s favour.
This case could also have an impact on interpretations of the scope of the agreement on technical barriers to trade (TBT), which explicitly rules against discrimination of final products based on the process of their production. Canada had asserted that France’s ban on asbestos was effectively a regulation of the characteristics and process of production, while the European Community (EC), representing France, asserted that the ban was not. The DSP agreed with France, and ruled that the French ban was not based on the characteristics and process of production, and thus not covered by the TBT agreement. The AB reversed this finding, taking the view that product characteristics could be presented in a positive or negative light.
In this case, France had specified that imports shall not contain asbestos fibres. "The effect of this ruling is that countries can circumvent a product and production method (PPM) analysis, at least as it relates to goods containing a banned product, by simply outlawing the hazardous substance as a whole," says London-based trade and environment analyst Kevin Gray.
Developing country concerns over green protectionism are legitimate, but they cannot simply continue to oppose negotiations on the links between trade and environment — they have to take them head on to make sure their concerns are addressed through legitimate multilateral negotiations, rather than through the back door, by a few people on a dispute settlement panel or appellate body.
Conflict with environment treaties
For instance, the discussion on the relationship between trade rules and MEAS has been uneasy to say the least. While the WTO currently allows importing countries the freedom to choose their own standards in the interests of public health and the environment in their own countries, they are not allowed to impose standards aimed at improving health or environmental practices of exporting countries. But can environmental standards be imposed on another country if a multilateral treaty has been signed to this effect? The EU considers it necessary to ensure that when there is dispute concerning environment-related trade measures, linkages between trade and environment are taken into account so that one does not jeopardise the fulfillment of the other.
Developing countries see the debate on MEAS as a non-trade issue, but it is in fact in their interests to sort out the issue once and for all, rather than leave the issues open for interpretation by the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. Several feasible options have been suggested in the past, such as moving environment-trade conflicts to tribunals provided specifically under MEAS; or moving such disputes to the International Court of Justice. But even before agreeing to a venue, developing countries must insist on clarification on a set of overarching rules. For instance, they should insist on a provision that forbids the use of trade sanctions to conserve the global environment, since such sanctions can only be used by the more economically powerful nations against the less economically powerful. Extra-jurisdictional and unilateral action should not be possible even within a multilateral agreement.
Northern green activists were not entirely happy with the outcome at Doha, though for reasons other than those troubling developing countries. The declaration states that negotiations on the relationship between trade and MEAS shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a party to the MEA in question. Greenpeace fears that this phrase would prove a powerful disincentive for countries to sign the MEAS. The declaration also states that negotiations on the effect of environmental measures on market access and the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) accord shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of Members under existing WTO agreements. These environmental activists feel that the final outcome of the negotiations on these points could end up as footnotes rather than effect any change in the WTO rules.
Marks of shame?
Ecolabelling started out as a consumer awareness aid to help them make better choices. The EU penchant for ecolabelling was on full display in all the pre-Doha drafts. Ecolabelling is a way to ensure that all exports are harmless to humans and the environment — in itself a rational and benign idea. However, its practice could erect new insurmountable barriers to exports from the poorer countries.
Ecolabelling requires that products be marked environmentally friendly not just because they do not directly harm the environment but also indirectly. At the centre of the debate is the ppm criterion which looks at the environmental-friendliness of the technologies used to make a product rather than the superficially judge the product, the final outcome of the process. Life cycle criterion is another specification applied for ecolabelling. This looks at the ppm, the product and how the product will be eventually disposed, making ecolabelling an even more stringent requirement. This has raised hackles in the developing world where state-of-the-art green technologies are seldom considered for their prohibitive costs. Insisting on ppm for labelling would bar most of poorer countries’ exports from the northern markets. At the moment this agenda has only been put on a fast track, but it is not for negotiations.
Pragmatic investment
Developing countries must try and use global investment rules for their benefit
Attempts by a few developing countries, including India and Malaysia, to keep investment out of the Doha declaration failed. The declaration calls for ‘clarifying elements’ of a possible multilateral investment framework, and recognises the need for a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment, particularly foreign investment that will contribute to the expansion of trade. A decision will be taken at the next ministerial conference on modalities of negotiations in this area.
Addressing a press conference in India after the Doha conference, minister for commerce and industry Murasoli Maran took solace in the fact that "nothing would happen immediately" and the negotiations would take their time "during which we have to be watchful". But rather than simply saying and then hoping that nothing will happen, the Indian government would do better to start thinking about what they would like out an investment treaty, which now seems inevitable. Otherwise, they will find themselves at a disadvantage, as industrialised countries jump a readymade pro-industry model such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on them. NAFTA gives foreign investors the right to sue host governments, which do not have the right to appeal once a decision has been reached. Such a multilateral framework can have deep repercussions for developing countries.
Civil society around the world has also been wary of attempts to establish global multilateral investment rules since the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) tried to secretly negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) that would vest MNCs with the power to question the decisions of national governments. These groups, based mostly in Europe and Canada, opposed the OECD MAI draft, but many believed that global multilateral investment rules were needed to stop the exploitation of developing countries through poorly negotiated bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of BITs signed from 385 at the end of the 1980s to 1,857 at the end of the 1990s. Often, BITs do not reflect a balance between the desire of developing country governments to attract FDI, and their domestic developmental concerns. At a meeting on foreign investments and their development dimensions organised by UNCTAD in 1997, some developing country governments considered themselves ill equipped to draw up balanced BITS, given the unequal bargaining power between industrialised and developing countries. Some contend that a global set of established guidelines could ensure the parameters of accountability, social and environmental responsibility. Others disagree.
In any multilateral negotiation on investment, industrialised countries will hold the aces, and are likely to have an inherent bias towards protecting the best interests of their companies, while developing countries will continue to play the role of desperate investment-seekers. There are no precedents to indicate that developing countries can expect anything but an unfair deal out of such an arrangement, particularly if the negotiations are conducted under the already biased WTO. Therefore, while an overreaching investments agreement may help developing countries out of having to compete with each other for investment, they will have to take care to ensure that the negotiations take place at a forum that is capable of taking on their development concerns.
Precautionary principle
The EU locked horns with the US by banning American beef exports on the ground that the beef was laced hormones that could cause cancer and other health problems. The ban was not upheld by the WTO because it was not convinced with the scientific evidence the EU had provided to prove its case and that it was imposing its higher standards on health and food safety on others. The EU insisted that it was acting according to the precautionary principle. This better-safe-than-sorry principle lets a country take a similar action like the one the EU took even in the absence of supporting scientific rationale.
The WTO had judged the case by the 1996 agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), which favoured a more scientifically demanding risk assessment to the precautionary principle. The US also proved that its beef hormones met standards set by Codex Alimentarius Commission, a world body that develops standards for food additives, pesticides, chemicals and contaminants. The precautionary principle has since become pet issue that the EU pushes in every WTO meeting. Doha was no exception. On the fourth day of the talks the EU broached the subject, but intense opposition kept it out of the final declaration.
At the insistence of the Philippines, the US and Iceland the Doha text pushes for negotiations on clarifying and improving WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies. Fisheries subsidies have been seen as a major cause for the depletion of fish stocks due to overfishing. Apart from the environmental impact the subsidies-caused depletion also undermines the livelihood of those dependant on fishing. This is particularly the case in many developing countries as the text also points out.
Though fisheries subsidies have figured in the WTO debates and in its predecessor GATT, no agreement was earmarked to cover the issue during the Uruguay Round. At the Seattle 1999 meeting a proposal was made to tackle environmentally harmful and trade-distorting fisheries subsidies but disagreements over which WTO body should cover the subject halted progress. The EU is one of the leading providers of subsidies to its fishermen and hence has been shying from bringing the issue into WTO forum. The presence of the subject vindicates the view that much give and take has transpired to prevent Doha ending up as a disaster.
(Down to Earth, December 15, 2001)
Why the project to link India's rivers is a mindless dream
By S S Jeevan
When Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared his government's commitment to linking all major Indian rivers in Parliament in November last year, there was great jubilation. All parliamentarians, including Leader of the Opposition Sonia Gandhi, promised him full support. The project would be an insurance against droughts and floods, Vajpayee thundered. It would divert water from flood-hit areas to drought-hit areas. Following the Supreme Court's directive, the government set up a Task Force headed by Suresh Prabhu, the former Union minister of power, to implement the plan. Projected at a cost of Rs 560,000 crore (and a 15 year deadline), the plan envisages the largest man-made water network in the world.
But today the jubilation has ebbed and reality is slowly sinking in. India's grand plan to link rivers is throwing up more problems than it set out to solve. Experts now believe that the project could lead the country towards environmental disaster, create regional discord, sour relations with neighbouring countries, degrade water and soil quality and bleed the exchequer. Above all, the greatest threat could to the community-based water management initiatives across the country, as this project seeks to centralise control over water.
A grand plan
The idea to link India's rivers is not a new one. K L Rao, then irrigation and power minister, first mooted it during the 1960s, at the height of Nehruvian socialism. But the proposal did not find favour with successive governments.. The present one — with a Himalayan and a Peninsular component — seeks to redraw the hydrological map of India, taking flood waters from 14 Himalayan tributaries of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers in northern India and Nepal and transferring them south via a series of canals and pumping stations, across the Vindhya mountains to replenish 17 southern rivers, including the Godavari, Krishna and Cauvery. Around 300 reservoirs will be constructed, and more than 1,000 kilometres of canals would be dug.
The impact too would be equally huge: the project would flood an estimated 8,000 square kilometres of land and leave 3 million people homeless, according to Sudhir Vombatkere, a retired military engineer who is now with the Mysore Consumer Action Forum. A similar project was proposed in the Soviet Union under Stalin, when rivers flowing north were to be diverted to its dry central region. But even Stalin's scientists decided ultimately that the project would cause too much ecological damage.
Ecological disaster
Environmentalists say that the plan will spread pollution from rivers like the Ganges to cleaner rivers. Inter-linking a toxic river with a non-toxic one will have a devastating impact on all our rivers and as consequence on all human beings and wildlife. "How can one even think of linking for instance, the mercury contaminated Par river of Gujarat or the poisonous waters of Yamuna river with any other uncontaminated river? The proposal is ecologically destructive," says Ravi Agarwal of Srishti, a Delhi-based non-governmental organisation. So when rivers are linked, pollution control will be even more difficult and many more rivers will turn into sewers.
Experts believe that there has not been much analysis as to how flow-irrigation affects soil health and the river health. For instance, every river's water properties are different. And the survival of a number of aquatic species, insects and birds depends on these unique properties. What impact the linking of rivers will have on them, nobody knows; and very little study has been done on regional variations.
Potential conflicts
It is assumed that the states that are not riparian will have no claims to the water of the rivers. Therefore a transfer of water from one region to another would be done only by consensus. But as the Cauvery experience shows that there is no easy solution to sharing river waters — even when the two warring states were both riparian. Since there is no agreement on the transfer of river water from a surplus region to a deficit one, conflicts between could increase thousandfold.
Already, Punjab has objected to the interlinking of rivers and earlier raised a hue and cry when Rajasthan — as a non-riparian state — was being given water from the Indus river system. There are other problems also. West Bengal, which is also objecting to the proposal, fears that any linking of the Ganga and the Brahmaputra might ease the flood situation in Assam, but worsen it in Bengal.
The linking of rivers could also seriously jeopardise India's relations with its neighbours, especially Bangladesh, which gets much of its waters from the Ganges and Brahmaputra after the rivers leave India. When India completed the Farakka barrage in the Ganga in 1974, it diverted the crucial dry-season flows into the Indian irrigation canals. The relations between the two countries have not been good since then. So far, there has been no comment from Dhaka on this project. It also remains to be seen as to how the cash-strapped government is going organise funds for the project. There are reports that Indian engineers in the US are lobbying President George W Bush to persuade the World Bank to back the scheme. Sources also reveal that the Centre might impose a one-rupee cess on every litre of petrol to raise the resources.
Future fears
One issue that is disturbing environmentalists is the control over the waters. One scenario being discussed is that rivers would be nationalised where the Centre will have control over the river waters. This could mean trouble for communities living on the banks of rivers, who could lose their rights they traditionally had over the river. It could spell doom for many communities who have helped to revive several dead rivers.
There is also a fear that with privatisation of water being discussed aggressively, rights over the river may shift from the hands of communities to multinational companies. The haste with which the government is proceeding with the project (including drawing up a timetable for implementation) without doing its homework on the project's feasibility and impact nor arriving at any consensus among the states concerned is worrying analysts. In the end it could just turn out to be an eyewash to derive some electoral gains. Another fear is that the only beneficiaries of this project could be the contractors and consultants and not the water-starved people of India. In truth, it cannot be more ironic: Every politician sitting inside Parliament applauded Vajpayee's commitment towards the project, but not one politician would want to share his state's water with the other.
(New Indian Express, June 15, 2003)
When Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared his government's commitment to linking all major Indian rivers in Parliament in November last year, there was great jubilation. All parliamentarians, including Leader of the Opposition Sonia Gandhi, promised him full support. The project would be an insurance against droughts and floods, Vajpayee thundered. It would divert water from flood-hit areas to drought-hit areas. Following the Supreme Court's directive, the government set up a Task Force headed by Suresh Prabhu, the former Union minister of power, to implement the plan. Projected at a cost of Rs 560,000 crore (and a 15 year deadline), the plan envisages the largest man-made water network in the world.
But today the jubilation has ebbed and reality is slowly sinking in. India's grand plan to link rivers is throwing up more problems than it set out to solve. Experts now believe that the project could lead the country towards environmental disaster, create regional discord, sour relations with neighbouring countries, degrade water and soil quality and bleed the exchequer. Above all, the greatest threat could to the community-based water management initiatives across the country, as this project seeks to centralise control over water.
A grand plan
The idea to link India's rivers is not a new one. K L Rao, then irrigation and power minister, first mooted it during the 1960s, at the height of Nehruvian socialism. But the proposal did not find favour with successive governments.. The present one — with a Himalayan and a Peninsular component — seeks to redraw the hydrological map of India, taking flood waters from 14 Himalayan tributaries of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers in northern India and Nepal and transferring them south via a series of canals and pumping stations, across the Vindhya mountains to replenish 17 southern rivers, including the Godavari, Krishna and Cauvery. Around 300 reservoirs will be constructed, and more than 1,000 kilometres of canals would be dug.
The impact too would be equally huge: the project would flood an estimated 8,000 square kilometres of land and leave 3 million people homeless, according to Sudhir Vombatkere, a retired military engineer who is now with the Mysore Consumer Action Forum. A similar project was proposed in the Soviet Union under Stalin, when rivers flowing north were to be diverted to its dry central region. But even Stalin's scientists decided ultimately that the project would cause too much ecological damage.
Ecological disaster
Environmentalists say that the plan will spread pollution from rivers like the Ganges to cleaner rivers. Inter-linking a toxic river with a non-toxic one will have a devastating impact on all our rivers and as consequence on all human beings and wildlife. "How can one even think of linking for instance, the mercury contaminated Par river of Gujarat or the poisonous waters of Yamuna river with any other uncontaminated river? The proposal is ecologically destructive," says Ravi Agarwal of Srishti, a Delhi-based non-governmental organisation. So when rivers are linked, pollution control will be even more difficult and many more rivers will turn into sewers.
Experts believe that there has not been much analysis as to how flow-irrigation affects soil health and the river health. For instance, every river's water properties are different. And the survival of a number of aquatic species, insects and birds depends on these unique properties. What impact the linking of rivers will have on them, nobody knows; and very little study has been done on regional variations.
Potential conflicts
It is assumed that the states that are not riparian will have no claims to the water of the rivers. Therefore a transfer of water from one region to another would be done only by consensus. But as the Cauvery experience shows that there is no easy solution to sharing river waters — even when the two warring states were both riparian. Since there is no agreement on the transfer of river water from a surplus region to a deficit one, conflicts between could increase thousandfold.
Already, Punjab has objected to the interlinking of rivers and earlier raised a hue and cry when Rajasthan — as a non-riparian state — was being given water from the Indus river system. There are other problems also. West Bengal, which is also objecting to the proposal, fears that any linking of the Ganga and the Brahmaputra might ease the flood situation in Assam, but worsen it in Bengal.
The linking of rivers could also seriously jeopardise India's relations with its neighbours, especially Bangladesh, which gets much of its waters from the Ganges and Brahmaputra after the rivers leave India. When India completed the Farakka barrage in the Ganga in 1974, it diverted the crucial dry-season flows into the Indian irrigation canals. The relations between the two countries have not been good since then. So far, there has been no comment from Dhaka on this project. It also remains to be seen as to how the cash-strapped government is going organise funds for the project. There are reports that Indian engineers in the US are lobbying President George W Bush to persuade the World Bank to back the scheme. Sources also reveal that the Centre might impose a one-rupee cess on every litre of petrol to raise the resources.
Future fears
One issue that is disturbing environmentalists is the control over the waters. One scenario being discussed is that rivers would be nationalised where the Centre will have control over the river waters. This could mean trouble for communities living on the banks of rivers, who could lose their rights they traditionally had over the river. It could spell doom for many communities who have helped to revive several dead rivers.
There is also a fear that with privatisation of water being discussed aggressively, rights over the river may shift from the hands of communities to multinational companies. The haste with which the government is proceeding with the project (including drawing up a timetable for implementation) without doing its homework on the project's feasibility and impact nor arriving at any consensus among the states concerned is worrying analysts. In the end it could just turn out to be an eyewash to derive some electoral gains. Another fear is that the only beneficiaries of this project could be the contractors and consultants and not the water-starved people of India. In truth, it cannot be more ironic: Every politician sitting inside Parliament applauded Vajpayee's commitment towards the project, but not one politician would want to share his state's water with the other.
(New Indian Express, June 15, 2003)
La conspiración del Endosulfan
(English version: http://www.cseindia.org/html/endosulfan/endosulfan_index.htm)
Una cruda exposición por la CSE, de cómo la industria de los plaguicidas intriga con los oficiales del gobierno y científicos en Kerala para levantar la prohibición de un plaguicida mortal. En juego está aquí la integridad de las decisiones del gobierno que impactarán las generaciones en el futuro. No solo crearán daños irreparables a los residentes de Kerala, sino que también hace una burla a lo que tiene que ver con la salud publica.
Fue en febrero del 2001 que Down to Earth denunció la historia.
Se pudo establecer una relación entre una extraña alta incidencia de deformidades y enfermedades en Padre – una pequeña población en el distrito de Kerala Kasaragod— y el endosulfan, un insecticida organoclorado. La “Plantation Corporation of Kerala” (PCK) ha estado asperjando endosulfan desde mediados de los 70 en sus plantaciones de marañón ó nuez de la india. La gente de Padre ha estado batallando sola durante mucho rato contra la aspersión de este plaguicida. Análisis de laboratorios conducidos por el Centro para la Ciencia y el Ambiente (Centre for Science and Environment, CSE), en Nueva Delhi, revelaron que todas las muestras colectadas en el pueblo contenían niveles muy altos de endosulfan, el cual ha sido irónicamente prohibido ó restringido en muchos países.
Una vez que la noticia se dio a conocer en los medios nacionales, la presión pública forzó a muchas decisiones. La Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos solicitó a las agencias gubernamentales incluyendo el Consejo Hindú de Investigaciones Médicas (ICMR), tomar acciones. Se inició un estudio del Instituto Nacional de Salud Ocupacional (NIOH). El gobierno de Kerala también estableció un comité dirigido por un ingeniero eminente: A. Achyuthan para evaluar el asunto. Tanto la Union como el gobierno estatal prohibieron las aspersiones aéreas de endosulfan. La cruzada parecía dirigirse hacia su lógica conclusión.
En vez, se abrió el “lobby” para el plaguicida ya que se lanzó una ofensiva para luchar por su permanencia. En juego estaba la suerte de una industria que vale Rs 4,100 crore (un crore=10 millones de rupias). Fue así como se inició una campaña virulenta que involucró altos funcionarios oficiales, científicos y agricultores. La agenda tenía dos objetivos: desacreditar el estudio de la CSE y probar que el endosulfan era seguro e inocuo. La estrategia de la campaña tuvo tres componentes: desinformación, fabricación de datos e influenciar a las agencias gubernamentales para levantar la prohibición.
Muy pronto artículos, entrevistas y anuncios empezaron a aparecer en los medios de comunicación mostrando al endosulfan como un insecticida seguro. Mientras tanto, un informe patrocinado por la industria se estaba preparando — PCK había comisionado al Fredrick Institute of Plant Protection and Toxicology (FIPPAT) en Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu, para conducir un estudio. Sin sorpresas, los resultados absolvieron completamente el endosulfan. Activistas que se oponían al endosulfan fueron amenazados con acciones legales, este fue solo el comienzo. A través de socialización de la empresa del insecticida con los científicos invitándolos a fiestas de cinco estrellas y lograr así el envío de emisarios o acompañantes oficiales a las reuniones. El “lobby” al plaguicida usó cada regla en el libro y fuera de ella para acabar con la campaña del público.
En muchas formas la batalla por el endosulfan es una prueba crucial para la industria — una derrota aquí podría no solo herir las ganancias, sino también animar más comunidades para salir al aire y colocar más plaguicidas en la lista negra.
Hasta el momento parece que su estrategia está funcionando. En marzo de este año, la prohibición del endosulfan se levantó bajo circunstancias misteriosas. El informe confidencial del NIOH — que Down To Earth posee — claramente implica al endosulfan como el agente causal de las enfermedades. Se ve con claridad cómo los clamores silenciosos de los residentes de Padre por una justicia ambiental han caído en oídos sordos.
KUSHAL P S YADAV, quien estuvo encubierto para socavar las suciedades y S S JEEVAN descubrieron las triquiñuelas que la industria utiliza para favorecer sus beneficios económicos sobre la salud del pueblo.
Fue una amenaza velada que Padma S Vankar nunca esperaba. Como consultora del laboratorio del CSE para monitorear la polución, ella había supervisado las pruebas de las muestras colectadas en Padre. Vankar está también encargada de las Facilidades para Pruebas Ecológicas y Analíticas en el Instituto Tecnológico de la India (IIT) en Kanpur. La amenaza vino en la forma de un inesperado visitante al IIT en septiembre del 2001. Conozca a M Raghavender.
Raghavender trabaja para EMFA (Endosulfan Manufacturers and Formulators Association= Asociación de Fabricantes y Formuladores de Endosulfan). Él fue al IIT con una agenda muy clara: distanciar el IIT del estudio del CSE y hacer que Vankar admitiera que sus hallazgos eran errados. En resumen desacreditar la credibilidad del estudio. “Él -me aconsejó- mantenerme lejos de estas controversias ya que era una mujer”, dijo Vankar. Pero Raghavender falló en ambos intentos, él era solo un pequeño peón en una bien orquestada campaña que había sido lanzada nacionalmente. La poderosa industria de plaguicidas se había enfrentado a su más duro desafío.
El poder de una industria
La industria de plaguicidas en India es la cuarta más grande en el mundo y la segunda más grande en la región Asia – Pacífica, solo después de la China. Estimativos del valor total de su mercado varían entre Rs 3,800 y Rs 4,100 crore. De acuerdo con la Asociación India de Productores y Formuladores de Plaguicidas (PMFAI), existen cerca de 55 productores básicos y 300 formuladores de plaguicidas. Además, hay un gran número de pequeños cerca de 200 que formulan productos genéricos en India. Los insecticidas solos son alrededor del 75% de este mercado y el cultivo del algodón consume casi la mitad de los plaguicidas producidos en el país. Las exportaciones de plaguicidas ascienden a Rs 1,600 crore (un crore=10 millones de rupias) en 2000-2001 y la industria confía en que llegue a Rs 1,800 crore durante este año.
La India es el productor más grande de endosulfan en el mundo, de acuerdo con EMFA. Las tres compañías más importantes que producen endosulfan en la India son: Excel Industries, Hindustan Insecticides Limited (HIL) y EID Parry.
De estas, Excel es la líder en el mercado en cuanto a endosulfan se trata. Por consiguiente, no es sorprendente que muchos de sus funcionarios hayan estado visitando Kerala durante el último año tratando de que el gobierno estatal levante la prohibición. “S Ganesan y otros funcionarios de Excel Industries han gastado una gran cantidad de tiempo en reuniones en Kerala con funcionarios del gobierno y científicos,” dice Sridhar R, un activista que trabaja con Thanal Conservation Action and Information Network, una ONG localizada en Thiruvananthapuram.
El Director General de Excel Industries, Ashwin C Shroff, rehusó hablar con Down To Earth aduciendo que el periódico tenía un cierto punto de vista. Pero él no pudo negar que endosulfan dicta los intereses de negocios de su compañía. “Estamos muy conscientes de nuestra dependencia del endosulfan. Es así como en los últimos 6-7 años de una muy alta dependencia de más del 60-65%, hemos llegado a un nivel de menos del 40%. Pero es como el producto bandera,” él le dijo a Business Line (Enero 21, 2001). Las ganancias tienen que protegerse a cualquier costo y así empezó la campaña.
El arte de la desinformación
En mayo del 2001, un anuncio aparentemente inocuo apareció en el diario de Bangalore. PMFAI había emitido una “clarificación sobre el endosulfan”. Los problemas de salud en el distrito de Kasaragod no se debían al endosulfan y que este era un plaguicida “registrado” y seguro”, decía. Esta clarificación se hacía para “el beneficio de los usuarios y del público en general y para aclarar la impresión incorrecta creada por los medios informativos”.
El anuncio fue un ejercicio para controlar el daño. Todos los periódicos y canales de televisión importantes habían cubierto extensivamente la tragedia del endosulfan en Padre. Las súplicas de los aldeanos en Padre con casos de parálisis cerebral, retardos mentales, cáncer y otras enfermedades capturaron la imaginación del público. Endosulfan había llegado a ser una mala palabra para todos. “El anuncio se distribuyó a los periódicos para educar a la gente (sic). “No le pusimos mucha atención al informe durante los primeros tres meses. Más tarde nos dimos cuenta que debíamos intervenir ya que estaba errado“, argumenta el presidente de PMFAI Pradeep P Dave. La Asociación organizó varias conferencias de prensa en Kerala aduciendo que el endosulfan se utilizaba en más de 60 países. Ambientalistas en Kerala cuestionaban el motivo detrás de la organización de tantas conferencias de prensa en un periodo de tiempo tan corto. “Esto fue claramente para desorientar a la gente,” dice Jayakumar C, coordinador de Thanal.
En junio, artículos que retomaban el caso del endosulfan aparecieron en revistas como Agriculture Today. Uno de estos artículos escrito por E V V Bhaskara Rao, Director del Centro Nacional de Investigaciones del Madroño (National Research Centre for Cashew) en Puttur, Karnataka, dijo: “Primero condenar el sospechoso luego conducir la investigación”. Obviamente refiriéndose al estudio del caso. Esta cita llegó a ser la más preferida para el “lobby” al plaguicida. Ganesan llegó a ser el seguidor más grande de la cita y escribió una carta con unos elogios desproporcionados: “Es una obra maestra, una mezcla perfecta de información científica y habilidad literaria”. En otro artículo, S K Handa, antes jefe de la División de Química Agrícola del ICMR, alegó que el estudio del CSE era “cuestionable” y “seudocientífico”. Es otro asunto que estos expertos no pudieran encontrar ninguna inexactitud científica en el estudio del CSE (ver ‘Pesticide Plot’, Down To Earth, Vol 10, No 10). Dave asentía cualquier cosa que Handa decía. Hablando a Business Standard, Dave decía que “el tema del endosulfan había sido exagerado”. Un miembro de PMFAI fue a implicar la endogamia como la causa de las “enfermedades extrañas” — “muchos de los afectados por estas enfermedades se reportan que están muy emparentados”. Teniendo en cuenta la radiación, esta Asociación ofrecía muchas explicaciones, “podrían ser contaminaciones microbiales en las corrientes de agua. O contaminaciones con metales pesados. O niveles nutricionales muy bajos”. En otras palabras, cualquier cosa bajo el sol pero no endosulfan.
La ciencia de fabricar datos
La campaña de desinformación trajo solo dividendos limitados para el “lobby” del plaguicida. Ellos aún necesitaban un estudio “científico” para contrarrestar el caso de CSE, y no tuvieron que esperar mucho. En febrero del 2001, un grupo de la Universidad de Agricultura de Kerala (Kerala Agricultural University, KAU), dirigido por M Abdul Salam, decano asociado del Colegio de Agricultura de esta universidad condujo un estudio en Kasaragod. Los resultados fueron sorprendentes. No encontraron residuos significativos de endosulfan en ninguna de las muestras. La industria no podía haber pedido más y se fueron a la ciudad con los resultados. Pero hubo pocos que lo tomaron. El estudio de KAU había llegado a ser algo como un chiste entre los círculos del conocimiento.
Las diferencias en el grupo de KAU habían lanzado una sombra sobre su credibilidad. Thomas George, quien analizó los residuos, se había lavado sus manos en lo concerniente al proceso del muestreo. “Yo nunca visité ese lugar (Kasaragod), por lo tanto no conozco como se colectaron las muestras ni dónde se colectaron. Simplemente hice el análisis de residuos para el grupo”, dijo George. El también fue muy claro indicando que solo estuvo vinculado con el grupo de KAU en la primera ronda de los análisis. “Yo no estuve involucrado la segunda vez,” dijo. Pero otros científicos del grupo juraron que George estuvo involucrado en ambos análisis — los documentos claramente mencionan su nombre en ambos trabajos.
Los activistas alegan que Salam y Samuel Mathew, otro miembro del grupo de KAU, fueron muy complacientes con los representantes de la industria. “Yo me reuní con ellos solo para realizar el estudio científico con endosulfan”, se defiende Mathew. La situación de Mathew es similar a la de un juez solicitando al acusado evidencias para salvarlo. Salam dice que él no fue influenciado por nadie. Más aún, aunque el grupo de KAU admitió los problemas encontrados durante la investigación en su informe “No disponibilidad de métodos rápidos y confiables para evaluar el nivel de contaminación del endosulfan en las muestras del ambiente, animales y humanos”, los activistas y la gente de Kerala habrían rechazado el estudio de KAU.
La conspiración del endosulfan tomó un nuevo rumbo cuando el PCK comisionó al Fredrick Institute of Plant Protection and Toxicology (FIPPAT) en Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu, para conducir un estudios a un costo de Rs 7 lakh, de acuerdo con el PCK . La controversia se armó desde el comienzo del estudio. Los aldeanos de Padre y otras áreas rehusaron cooperar con este grupo para tomar muestras ya que ellos sabían que era un estudio patrocinado por la industria. “Nosotros no supimos siquiera cuando ellos tomaron las muestras,” dijo Shree Padre, un periodista agrícola quien junto con Mohana Kumar Y S, un doctor en medicina en Padre, había protestado contra las aspersiones durante muchos años. “Más tarde supimos que las muestras fueron colectadas de trabajadores jóvenes de PCK, y no de los aldeanos”, dice Sripathy Kajampady, un doctor en Kasaragod quien ha estado luchando por las víctimas. El Director de FIPPAT, Balakrishnamurthy refuta estas alegaciones: “Nosotros realizamos una colección científica con la ayuda de las autoridades apropiadas”. Los miembros del comité Achyuthan — constituidos por el gobierno estatal. — están sin embargo poco satisfechos. Ellos han criticado el informe por inadecuada toma de muestras y también la falta de chequeo cruzado de los resultados con un laboratorio diferente.
El “lobby” al plaguicida fue rápido en cuestionar el estudio del CSE diciendo que había usado ácido sulfúrico concentrado y por esto debía ser verificado por personal independiente experto en residuos. Es otro tema a discutir que mientras el estudio del CSE no utilizó ácido sulfúrico en muestras de sangres, el estudio del FIPPAT, que la industria condujo si lo utilizó.
Es increíble. CSE colectó las muestras unos pocos días después de la aspersión y encontró altos niveles de endosulfan en todas las muestras. “El estudio de FIPPAT, aunque se inició un mes más tarde que el de CSE, muestra justo los resultados opuestos, esto es, completa ausencia de residuos de endosulfan en las muestras de sangre, leche de vaca y agua”, dice el informe de NIOH.
Más aún, NIOH, que hizo su estudio casi 10 meses después de la última aspersión, encontró residuos de endosulfan en muestras de agua colectadas en Kasaragod. NIOH también encontró residuos en las muestras de sangre de niños de la escuela de Vaninagar. “La detección de endosulfan en las muestras de sangre y agua, 10 meses después de la última aspersión de endosulfan, significa una exposición continua al endosulfan”, dice el informe. Aunque el estudio de FIPPAT fue comisionado al PCK, este fue presentado por Dave de PMFAI en una conferencia de prensa en Kozhikode y Thiruvananthapuram, donde apartes seleccionados se reprodujeron para la prensa. “Esto claramente señala los nexos entre la industria- PCK y FIPPAT,” dice Jayakumar. Activistas en Kerala y gente de Kasaragod habían marcado el estudio de FIPPAT como “un esfuerzo bien orquestado de la industria”.
Un incidente interesante que prueba el nexo entre la industria y los laboratorios privados ocurrió cuando la industria hizo una presentación ante el Comité de Achyuthan. El científico de FIPPAT, A Ramesh, acompañó al grupo de la industria que incluía a Dave y S Ganesan de Excel Industries. “Irónicamente el científico de FIPPAT no acompañó al grupo de PCK, que había solicitado el estudio,” dice Achyuthan. Cuando Down To Earth preguntó al Director de FIPPAT que negocio tenía el científico al acompañar al grupo de la industria a una reunión con un Comité del gobierno, él dijo: “Él podría haber ido en el mismo carro, pero no estaba con ellos”. Cuando se le dijo que las criticas de Ramesh del análisis del CSE se registraron en el informe final del comité, él dio una respuesta contradictoria, “No es un gran crimen (acompañar el grupo de la industria), pero no estamos asociados con ninguna industria.”
La intimidación ingeniosa
Los próximos blancos de la industria fueron científicos y funcionarios que estaban en los comités que podían decidir sobre la suerte del endosulfan.
Némesis de la industria
Un informe del Instituto Nacional de Salud Ocupacional se pregunta sobre el endosulfan. ¿Por qué los productores de plaguicidas lo quieren mantener a toda costa?
En agosto del 2001, la Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (NHRC) solicitó al Consejo Hindú de Investigación Médica (Indian Council of Medical Research, ICMR), someter un informe sobre los riesgos a la salud debidos a las aspersiones con endosulfan en las plantaciones de marañón en el distrito de Kasaragod durante cuatro meses. La ICMR a su vez solicitó al Instituto Nacional de Salud Ocupacional (NIOH) en Ahmedabad, que enviara un grupo a Kerala.
Un grupo de tres miembros del NIOH — conformado por el Director del NIOH, H N Saiyed, el diputado Aruna Dewan y H R Rajmohan del Centro Regional de salud ocupacional (Regional Occupational Health Centre, ROHC) en Bangalore — visitaron el distrito en agosto 9-11 y de nuevo en septiembre. Ellos tenían un mandato claro: un estudio epidemiológico ambiental a través de las zonas para investigar el patrón de la enfermedad en las villas afectadas y en una población control.
El grupo fue conducido por Saiyed y estaba conformado por miembros de NIOH, ROHC y el Departamento Pediátrico del Kasturba Medical College en Mangalore. El estudio de campo fue conducido entre septiembre 24 y octubre 7. En la primera fase, muestras de sangre de 262 niños de escuela (170 expuestos y 92 control) se colectaron para detectar residuos de endosulfan, análisis hormonal, hormonas de la tiroides, hormonas sexuales y estudios citogenéticos.
Es significativo que el grupo del NIOH decidió seleccionar un grupo control. Un grupo control es comparable con el grupo expuesto en todos los aspectos, excepto por la exposición al insecticida en este caso el endosulfan.
El informe de NIOH indica que endosulfan es la causa de un buen número de problemas de salud entre los niños de escuela que viven en las zonas expuestas. Estos niños tienen significativamente un menor nivel de inteligencia que el grupo control. Ellos también tienen una alta incidencia de varios desordenes sexuales cuando se los compara con el grupo control.
El informe finalizó en marzo del 2002, pero ha sido mantenido en secreto. Solo unos pocos tienen acceso a sus resultados. Down To Earth se las arregló para conseguir una copia, del cual solo hay disponibles unas pocas copias. Muchos activistas y los medios periodísticos no tienen una sola información de los hallazgos. “Este maldito informe se ha mantenido en secreto debido a que claramente implica la industria de los plaguicidas”, pregunta Jayakumar C de Thanal, una ONG de Thiruvananthapuram.
El negocio del envenenamiento
Endosulfan constituye solo una pequeña porción del mercado de plaguicidas. ¿Entonces por qué la industria esta paranoica?
La protesta contra el endosulfan en Kerala ha sido un símbolo de lucha contra plaguicidas en la India. La industria de plaguicidas está preocupada con el endosulfan así como con otros de sus productos. Como Dave orgullosamente lo pone, “Yo no defiendo solo una molécula, soy el presidente de 200 moléculas. Nosotros no prohibimos cualquier cosa solo sobre la base de que esté prohibido en otros países”. Si endosulfan se prohibe en Kerala, esto podría tener un efecto de cascada en el resto del país.
Una campaña exitosa para prohibir un plaguicida en particular alimentaria el fuego para otros movimientos también en la India. Más plaguicidas deberían estar bajo escrutinio. Más comunidades deberían sentirse animadas a protestar. Y más plaguicidas deberían estar en la lista negra. Esto es algo que la industria no puede permitir que ocurra. Hay informes de que un problema similar ocurre en Karnataka.
La Corporación de Desarrollo de Karnataka del Marañón (The Karnataka Cashew Development Corporation) ha estado asperjando el endosulfan sobre sus plantaciones en los distritos de Dakshina Kannada y Udipi desde 1987. La gente en estas áreas está también sufriendo de enfermedades extrañas (ver ‘Double Trouble’, Down To Earth, Vol 10, No 11).
Un plan de un juego largo
La mira de la campaña de la industria es, de hecho, mucho más grande. Es estrangular todas las voces que están abogando por una prohibición de los plaguicidas. En el ámbito mundial, la concientización acerca de los efectos dañinos de los plaguicidas en humanos así como en el ambiente está incrementándose. Los gobiernos están amarrados a la presión de los grupos civiles de la sociedad para prohibir plaguicidas y químicos dañinos. El año pasado, Colombia prohibió el endosulfan. Filipinas reinstaló la prohibición del endosulfan después de una larga batalla con la industria. Otros países están restringiendo el uso de este insecticida ó prohibiendo su uso completamente. La industria está sintiendo el calor por más de una razón. Recientemente, la India firmó la Convención de Estocolmo, un tratado global para proteger la salud humana y el ambiente de polutos orgánicos persistentes (POPS). Los Pops son químicos que permanecen en el ambiente por largos periodos de tiempo. Al implementar la Convención, los gobiernos eliminarían o reducirían la liberación de Pops en el ambiente. En la primera fase, 12 Pops se han identificado para ser eliminados. Endosulfan no está aún en esta lista, pero tiene todos los ingredientes para hacerlo en la próxima ronda.
A medida que la presión de los consumidores aumenta, las organizaciones corporativas se están alejando voluntariamente de los plaguicidas. “Los representantes de la industria me dijeron que el endosulfan para las plantaciones de marañón es solo un mercado pequeño. Ellos están más interesados en el uso del endosulfan en algodón y en otros estados, dicen que si se prohibe en Kerala, tendría repercusiones en toda la India”, comenta Salam. Cuando a Dave se le preguntó si ellos se sentían amenazados por estas campañas (como la de Kerala) él respondió: “Es solo que tenemos que proteger nuestros intereses y presentar nuestro lado de la historia”.
Reglamentación y Renegados
Las regulaciones de plaguicidas en la India son laxas. La industria ha aprovechado todas las oportunidades para corromper el sistema y el gobierno se ha hecho el ciego ante el problema. Los plaguicidas son regulados bajo el Acta de Insecticidas de 1998 y la reglamentación de los Insecticidas de 1971. En mayo del 2000, La ley 2000 de Insecticidas (Enmienda), se pasó bajo la sombra de muertes suicidas de los agricultores debido a plaguicidas adulterados. Esta enmienda hizo que la penalización por plaguicidas adulterados fuera más estricta. Pero hizo muy poco para limpiar las regulaciones de registro de los plaguicidas y monitorear esta industria del veneno. El Acta de Insecticidas regula la importación, manufactura, venta, transporte, distribución y uso de insecticidas para prevenir cualquier riesgo a la gente y animales. El Comité de registros, constituido bajo la Sección 5 del Acta, registra un insecticida después de verificar su eficacia y seguridad a humanos, animales y el ambiente. La Oficina Central de Insecticidas (Central Insecticides Board, CIB) localizada en Faridabad, Haryana, aconseja a la Union y gobiernos estatales sobre asuntos técnicos. En el 2001, un total de 2718 solicitudes se recibieron para registro, de las cuales 1439 se aprobaron, de acuerdo al gobierno.
Básicamente, hay dos tipos de registros bajo la Sección 9 del Acta de Insecticidas — primaria y secundaria. Cuando una molécula nueva se registra en India consigue un registro primario. Solicitudes subsecuentes para la misma molécula logran el registro secundario. Para registrar una molécula nueva se requiere generar estudios — información dependiente del ambiente bajo las condiciones agroclimáticas de la India e información independiente del ambiente. Los datos independientes del ambiente se pueden tomar directamente de la información existente en otras partes del mundo. Pero la generación de información dependiente del ambiente por lo general toma entre 4-5 años. La información sobre varios sujetos que incluyen toxicología y fitotoxicología es necesario generarla para el registro de cualquier molécula nueva. Una vez que un registro primario existe, otros que solicitan registros nuevos pueden solicitar un registro secundario. Por supuesto estas son solo reglas prescritas por el gobierno pero rara vez se cumplen.
Sistema infestado por plagas
El primer paso para registrar un insecticida nuevo es la generación de información. Este es también el primer paso donde la corrupción se inicia. Una compañía tiene la opción de ir a un laboratorio del gobierno ó a laboratorios privados comerciales aprobados por el gobierno “Las compañías por lo general prefieren los laboratorios privados comerciales ya que ellos pueden generar los resultados y muy rápidamente. Los trámites burocráticos en los laboratorios del gobierno pueden causar grandes demoras”, dice N G Waghle, antes vicepresidente, de Pest Control India Limited. “Los laboratorios privados son los primeros en satisfacer las demandas de la industria”, él adiciona. Donde todo tiene su precio.
“Los procedimientos hindúes para el registro son desconsoladores. Es un gran tamasha,” dice P D Deshmukh, un funcionario antiguo de una industria de plaguicidas. Con una experiencia en la industria de 30 años, Deshmukh tiene anécdotas asombrosas para contar. “Yo conozco un laboratorio que promete generar datos toxicológicos para un producto en un día. Generar estos datos normalmente toma entre un año y año y medio. El director del laboratorio me dijo que él arreglaba el intercambio de cartas por un año — haciéndolas aparecer como si la solicitud se hubiera hecho hace un año. Muchas compañías multinacionales e Hindúes son parte de esta patraña,” alega Deshmukh. “Es tenebroso imaginar cuantos plaguicidas peligrosos han podido llegar a los agricultores sin pruebas adecuadas”, se asusta Waghle.
Recordando sus 35 años de experiencia en la industria, Waghle, recuerda historias chocantes de cómo las compañías han corrompido altos funcionarios de los organismos de registros de plaguicidas. “Las compañías están atentas a contactar directamente los funcionarios del CIB, para que ellos usen los servicios de un negociador”, él dice. Los agentes actúan como un enlace entre la industria y el CIB. El soborno a los funcionarios de bajo y alto perfil en los CIB se hace a través de estos agentes designados. La industria ha convertido estos sobornos en un arte y el agente ó negociador es una parte integral de este juego.
Fea interfase
El negociador es por lo general una cara regular en el CIB, dice Waghle, por lo que los funcionarios se sienten cómodos interactuando con él. La industria paga este agente por todo el trabajo sucio que ellos quieren que se haga — el registro de una nueva molécula, ó robar información de una molécula previamente registrada, ó aún sobornando los miembros del Comité para influenciar la toma de decisiones a alto nivel. Pero el soborno no es siempre dinero.
Muchos altos funcionarios del CIB, incluyendo los miembros del Comité de Registros, regularmente reciben invitaciones a viajes de recreo, dice Waghle. La compañía paga todos los gastos — tiquetes aéreos, acomodaciones en hoteles de cinco estrellas y aún gastos de compras en almacenes. De nuevo no hay una relación directa con la industria, todo es hecho por el agente.
Reglas y renegados
“El funcionario simplemente tiene que informar al agente, con quién tiene después que entrar en contacto la compañía. La compañía paga al agente por todo el trabajo sucio”, él adiciona. Waghle le ha proporcionado a Down To Earth los nombres de unos pocos de los legendarios agentes y de sus clientes.
Las leyes están hechas para proteger a la industria. La industria del endosulfan ha utilizado estos agujeros para su gran provecho. Por ejemplo, el PCK violó muchas regulaciones mientras conducía aspersiones aéreas. El Acta de Insecticidas hace mandatorio que una compañía informe a la gente acerca de las aspersiones aéreas de plaguicidas. Todos los reservorios de aguas en el área deben estar cubiertos durante la aspersión. Pero esto no fue hecho por el PCK. “El CIB ha prescrito que las aspersiones con endosulfan deben ser hechas a una altura no mayor de 2-3 metros sobre el follaje. Pero aún esto no se cumplió en las plantaciones del PCK”, dice L Sundaresan, antiguo Director del Departamento de Agricultura de Kerala.
“Las aspersiones aéreas de endosulfan no fueron permitidas por el CIB después de 1993. El CIB había dado aprobación para las aspersiones aéreas de endosulfan al PCK solo hasta diciembre de 1992. Pero el Departamento de Agricultura en Kerala y el distrito han autorizado aplicaciones aéreas aún hasta enero del 2001”, alega Jayakumar.
La Union del gobierno hizo muchos esfuerzos para hacer el uso de los plaguicidas “seguro”. Esto apuntó hacia los comités. Estos comités permitieron el uso de endosulfan con una palabra de precaución: los plaguicidas deben usarse muy cuidadosamente y especificar las áreas donde no deben ser usados. En 1991 la Union del gobierno organizó un comité liderado por S N Banerjee, anteriormente Consejero del Gobierno en Protección de Plantas, para revisar si algunos plaguicidas, incluyendo endosulfan, deberían ser utilizados en la India. El Comité dijo que el Comité de Registros del CIB no debería permitir el uso del endosulfan cerca a ríos, lagos, mar o pantanos. El Comité también recomendó que se colocara un anuncio de advertencia en todos los rótulos y folletos de los recipientes. En relación con otros anuncios, las compañías despliegan esta advertencia en una letra tan pequeña que es difícil leerla.
Otro Comité liderado por R B Singh, hizo recomendaciones similares en 1999. El reenforzó el hecho de que el rótulo debería ser obligatorio en letras en negrilla para evitar el uso del endosulfan cerca a fuentes de agua. La 195ava reunión del Comité de Registros del CIB, conducida en diciembre de 1999, acordó implementar las recomendaciones. Pero nunca fueron realmente implementadas. El CIB ha escogido sentarse en estas recomendaciones. Endosulfan aún se utiliza indiscriminadamente, como la tragedia de Kasaragod lo muestra.
A la industria de plaguicidas no le gusta las regulaciones del Acta de Insecticidas diciendo que los procedimientos engorrosos para el registro están estrangulando su crecimiento. Pero, viendo la forma que la industria tiene para sortear estos procedimientos, ciertamente, saltándose sobre todas las normas de decencia en el caso del endosulfan, queda muy claro que este negocio “sucio” necesita más y no menos controles. Pero esta vez necesita monitores que tengan un control público. De otra forma, esta industria de muerte llegará a ser aún más mortal en los próximos años.
(Down To Earth, July 15th 2002)
Una cruda exposición por la CSE, de cómo la industria de los plaguicidas intriga con los oficiales del gobierno y científicos en Kerala para levantar la prohibición de un plaguicida mortal. En juego está aquí la integridad de las decisiones del gobierno que impactarán las generaciones en el futuro. No solo crearán daños irreparables a los residentes de Kerala, sino que también hace una burla a lo que tiene que ver con la salud publica.
Fue en febrero del 2001 que Down to Earth denunció la historia.
Se pudo establecer una relación entre una extraña alta incidencia de deformidades y enfermedades en Padre – una pequeña población en el distrito de Kerala Kasaragod— y el endosulfan, un insecticida organoclorado. La “Plantation Corporation of Kerala” (PCK) ha estado asperjando endosulfan desde mediados de los 70 en sus plantaciones de marañón ó nuez de la india. La gente de Padre ha estado batallando sola durante mucho rato contra la aspersión de este plaguicida. Análisis de laboratorios conducidos por el Centro para la Ciencia y el Ambiente (Centre for Science and Environment, CSE), en Nueva Delhi, revelaron que todas las muestras colectadas en el pueblo contenían niveles muy altos de endosulfan, el cual ha sido irónicamente prohibido ó restringido en muchos países.
Una vez que la noticia se dio a conocer en los medios nacionales, la presión pública forzó a muchas decisiones. La Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos solicitó a las agencias gubernamentales incluyendo el Consejo Hindú de Investigaciones Médicas (ICMR), tomar acciones. Se inició un estudio del Instituto Nacional de Salud Ocupacional (NIOH). El gobierno de Kerala también estableció un comité dirigido por un ingeniero eminente: A. Achyuthan para evaluar el asunto. Tanto la Union como el gobierno estatal prohibieron las aspersiones aéreas de endosulfan. La cruzada parecía dirigirse hacia su lógica conclusión.
En vez, se abrió el “lobby” para el plaguicida ya que se lanzó una ofensiva para luchar por su permanencia. En juego estaba la suerte de una industria que vale Rs 4,100 crore (un crore=10 millones de rupias). Fue así como se inició una campaña virulenta que involucró altos funcionarios oficiales, científicos y agricultores. La agenda tenía dos objetivos: desacreditar el estudio de la CSE y probar que el endosulfan era seguro e inocuo. La estrategia de la campaña tuvo tres componentes: desinformación, fabricación de datos e influenciar a las agencias gubernamentales para levantar la prohibición.
Muy pronto artículos, entrevistas y anuncios empezaron a aparecer en los medios de comunicación mostrando al endosulfan como un insecticida seguro. Mientras tanto, un informe patrocinado por la industria se estaba preparando — PCK había comisionado al Fredrick Institute of Plant Protection and Toxicology (FIPPAT) en Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu, para conducir un estudio. Sin sorpresas, los resultados absolvieron completamente el endosulfan. Activistas que se oponían al endosulfan fueron amenazados con acciones legales, este fue solo el comienzo. A través de socialización de la empresa del insecticida con los científicos invitándolos a fiestas de cinco estrellas y lograr así el envío de emisarios o acompañantes oficiales a las reuniones. El “lobby” al plaguicida usó cada regla en el libro y fuera de ella para acabar con la campaña del público.
En muchas formas la batalla por el endosulfan es una prueba crucial para la industria — una derrota aquí podría no solo herir las ganancias, sino también animar más comunidades para salir al aire y colocar más plaguicidas en la lista negra.
Hasta el momento parece que su estrategia está funcionando. En marzo de este año, la prohibición del endosulfan se levantó bajo circunstancias misteriosas. El informe confidencial del NIOH — que Down To Earth posee — claramente implica al endosulfan como el agente causal de las enfermedades. Se ve con claridad cómo los clamores silenciosos de los residentes de Padre por una justicia ambiental han caído en oídos sordos.
KUSHAL P S YADAV, quien estuvo encubierto para socavar las suciedades y S S JEEVAN descubrieron las triquiñuelas que la industria utiliza para favorecer sus beneficios económicos sobre la salud del pueblo.
Fue una amenaza velada que Padma S Vankar nunca esperaba. Como consultora del laboratorio del CSE para monitorear la polución, ella había supervisado las pruebas de las muestras colectadas en Padre. Vankar está también encargada de las Facilidades para Pruebas Ecológicas y Analíticas en el Instituto Tecnológico de la India (IIT) en Kanpur. La amenaza vino en la forma de un inesperado visitante al IIT en septiembre del 2001. Conozca a M Raghavender.
Raghavender trabaja para EMFA (Endosulfan Manufacturers and Formulators Association= Asociación de Fabricantes y Formuladores de Endosulfan). Él fue al IIT con una agenda muy clara: distanciar el IIT del estudio del CSE y hacer que Vankar admitiera que sus hallazgos eran errados. En resumen desacreditar la credibilidad del estudio. “Él -me aconsejó- mantenerme lejos de estas controversias ya que era una mujer”, dijo Vankar. Pero Raghavender falló en ambos intentos, él era solo un pequeño peón en una bien orquestada campaña que había sido lanzada nacionalmente. La poderosa industria de plaguicidas se había enfrentado a su más duro desafío.
El poder de una industria
La industria de plaguicidas en India es la cuarta más grande en el mundo y la segunda más grande en la región Asia – Pacífica, solo después de la China. Estimativos del valor total de su mercado varían entre Rs 3,800 y Rs 4,100 crore. De acuerdo con la Asociación India de Productores y Formuladores de Plaguicidas (PMFAI), existen cerca de 55 productores básicos y 300 formuladores de plaguicidas. Además, hay un gran número de pequeños cerca de 200 que formulan productos genéricos en India. Los insecticidas solos son alrededor del 75% de este mercado y el cultivo del algodón consume casi la mitad de los plaguicidas producidos en el país. Las exportaciones de plaguicidas ascienden a Rs 1,600 crore (un crore=10 millones de rupias) en 2000-2001 y la industria confía en que llegue a Rs 1,800 crore durante este año.
La India es el productor más grande de endosulfan en el mundo, de acuerdo con EMFA. Las tres compañías más importantes que producen endosulfan en la India son: Excel Industries, Hindustan Insecticides Limited (HIL) y EID Parry.
De estas, Excel es la líder en el mercado en cuanto a endosulfan se trata. Por consiguiente, no es sorprendente que muchos de sus funcionarios hayan estado visitando Kerala durante el último año tratando de que el gobierno estatal levante la prohibición. “S Ganesan y otros funcionarios de Excel Industries han gastado una gran cantidad de tiempo en reuniones en Kerala con funcionarios del gobierno y científicos,” dice Sridhar R, un activista que trabaja con Thanal Conservation Action and Information Network, una ONG localizada en Thiruvananthapuram.
El Director General de Excel Industries, Ashwin C Shroff, rehusó hablar con Down To Earth aduciendo que el periódico tenía un cierto punto de vista. Pero él no pudo negar que endosulfan dicta los intereses de negocios de su compañía. “Estamos muy conscientes de nuestra dependencia del endosulfan. Es así como en los últimos 6-7 años de una muy alta dependencia de más del 60-65%, hemos llegado a un nivel de menos del 40%. Pero es como el producto bandera,” él le dijo a Business Line (Enero 21, 2001). Las ganancias tienen que protegerse a cualquier costo y así empezó la campaña.
El arte de la desinformación
En mayo del 2001, un anuncio aparentemente inocuo apareció en el diario de Bangalore. PMFAI había emitido una “clarificación sobre el endosulfan”. Los problemas de salud en el distrito de Kasaragod no se debían al endosulfan y que este era un plaguicida “registrado” y seguro”, decía. Esta clarificación se hacía para “el beneficio de los usuarios y del público en general y para aclarar la impresión incorrecta creada por los medios informativos”.
El anuncio fue un ejercicio para controlar el daño. Todos los periódicos y canales de televisión importantes habían cubierto extensivamente la tragedia del endosulfan en Padre. Las súplicas de los aldeanos en Padre con casos de parálisis cerebral, retardos mentales, cáncer y otras enfermedades capturaron la imaginación del público. Endosulfan había llegado a ser una mala palabra para todos. “El anuncio se distribuyó a los periódicos para educar a la gente (sic). “No le pusimos mucha atención al informe durante los primeros tres meses. Más tarde nos dimos cuenta que debíamos intervenir ya que estaba errado“, argumenta el presidente de PMFAI Pradeep P Dave. La Asociación organizó varias conferencias de prensa en Kerala aduciendo que el endosulfan se utilizaba en más de 60 países. Ambientalistas en Kerala cuestionaban el motivo detrás de la organización de tantas conferencias de prensa en un periodo de tiempo tan corto. “Esto fue claramente para desorientar a la gente,” dice Jayakumar C, coordinador de Thanal.
En junio, artículos que retomaban el caso del endosulfan aparecieron en revistas como Agriculture Today. Uno de estos artículos escrito por E V V Bhaskara Rao, Director del Centro Nacional de Investigaciones del Madroño (National Research Centre for Cashew) en Puttur, Karnataka, dijo: “Primero condenar el sospechoso luego conducir la investigación”. Obviamente refiriéndose al estudio del caso. Esta cita llegó a ser la más preferida para el “lobby” al plaguicida. Ganesan llegó a ser el seguidor más grande de la cita y escribió una carta con unos elogios desproporcionados: “Es una obra maestra, una mezcla perfecta de información científica y habilidad literaria”. En otro artículo, S K Handa, antes jefe de la División de Química Agrícola del ICMR, alegó que el estudio del CSE era “cuestionable” y “seudocientífico”. Es otro asunto que estos expertos no pudieran encontrar ninguna inexactitud científica en el estudio del CSE (ver ‘Pesticide Plot’, Down To Earth, Vol 10, No 10). Dave asentía cualquier cosa que Handa decía. Hablando a Business Standard, Dave decía que “el tema del endosulfan había sido exagerado”. Un miembro de PMFAI fue a implicar la endogamia como la causa de las “enfermedades extrañas” — “muchos de los afectados por estas enfermedades se reportan que están muy emparentados”. Teniendo en cuenta la radiación, esta Asociación ofrecía muchas explicaciones, “podrían ser contaminaciones microbiales en las corrientes de agua. O contaminaciones con metales pesados. O niveles nutricionales muy bajos”. En otras palabras, cualquier cosa bajo el sol pero no endosulfan.
La ciencia de fabricar datos
La campaña de desinformación trajo solo dividendos limitados para el “lobby” del plaguicida. Ellos aún necesitaban un estudio “científico” para contrarrestar el caso de CSE, y no tuvieron que esperar mucho. En febrero del 2001, un grupo de la Universidad de Agricultura de Kerala (Kerala Agricultural University, KAU), dirigido por M Abdul Salam, decano asociado del Colegio de Agricultura de esta universidad condujo un estudio en Kasaragod. Los resultados fueron sorprendentes. No encontraron residuos significativos de endosulfan en ninguna de las muestras. La industria no podía haber pedido más y se fueron a la ciudad con los resultados. Pero hubo pocos que lo tomaron. El estudio de KAU había llegado a ser algo como un chiste entre los círculos del conocimiento.
Las diferencias en el grupo de KAU habían lanzado una sombra sobre su credibilidad. Thomas George, quien analizó los residuos, se había lavado sus manos en lo concerniente al proceso del muestreo. “Yo nunca visité ese lugar (Kasaragod), por lo tanto no conozco como se colectaron las muestras ni dónde se colectaron. Simplemente hice el análisis de residuos para el grupo”, dijo George. El también fue muy claro indicando que solo estuvo vinculado con el grupo de KAU en la primera ronda de los análisis. “Yo no estuve involucrado la segunda vez,” dijo. Pero otros científicos del grupo juraron que George estuvo involucrado en ambos análisis — los documentos claramente mencionan su nombre en ambos trabajos.
Los activistas alegan que Salam y Samuel Mathew, otro miembro del grupo de KAU, fueron muy complacientes con los representantes de la industria. “Yo me reuní con ellos solo para realizar el estudio científico con endosulfan”, se defiende Mathew. La situación de Mathew es similar a la de un juez solicitando al acusado evidencias para salvarlo. Salam dice que él no fue influenciado por nadie. Más aún, aunque el grupo de KAU admitió los problemas encontrados durante la investigación en su informe “No disponibilidad de métodos rápidos y confiables para evaluar el nivel de contaminación del endosulfan en las muestras del ambiente, animales y humanos”, los activistas y la gente de Kerala habrían rechazado el estudio de KAU.
La conspiración del endosulfan tomó un nuevo rumbo cuando el PCK comisionó al Fredrick Institute of Plant Protection and Toxicology (FIPPAT) en Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu, para conducir un estudios a un costo de Rs 7 lakh, de acuerdo con el PCK . La controversia se armó desde el comienzo del estudio. Los aldeanos de Padre y otras áreas rehusaron cooperar con este grupo para tomar muestras ya que ellos sabían que era un estudio patrocinado por la industria. “Nosotros no supimos siquiera cuando ellos tomaron las muestras,” dijo Shree Padre, un periodista agrícola quien junto con Mohana Kumar Y S, un doctor en medicina en Padre, había protestado contra las aspersiones durante muchos años. “Más tarde supimos que las muestras fueron colectadas de trabajadores jóvenes de PCK, y no de los aldeanos”, dice Sripathy Kajampady, un doctor en Kasaragod quien ha estado luchando por las víctimas. El Director de FIPPAT, Balakrishnamurthy refuta estas alegaciones: “Nosotros realizamos una colección científica con la ayuda de las autoridades apropiadas”. Los miembros del comité Achyuthan — constituidos por el gobierno estatal. — están sin embargo poco satisfechos. Ellos han criticado el informe por inadecuada toma de muestras y también la falta de chequeo cruzado de los resultados con un laboratorio diferente.
El “lobby” al plaguicida fue rápido en cuestionar el estudio del CSE diciendo que había usado ácido sulfúrico concentrado y por esto debía ser verificado por personal independiente experto en residuos. Es otro tema a discutir que mientras el estudio del CSE no utilizó ácido sulfúrico en muestras de sangres, el estudio del FIPPAT, que la industria condujo si lo utilizó.
Es increíble. CSE colectó las muestras unos pocos días después de la aspersión y encontró altos niveles de endosulfan en todas las muestras. “El estudio de FIPPAT, aunque se inició un mes más tarde que el de CSE, muestra justo los resultados opuestos, esto es, completa ausencia de residuos de endosulfan en las muestras de sangre, leche de vaca y agua”, dice el informe de NIOH.
Más aún, NIOH, que hizo su estudio casi 10 meses después de la última aspersión, encontró residuos de endosulfan en muestras de agua colectadas en Kasaragod. NIOH también encontró residuos en las muestras de sangre de niños de la escuela de Vaninagar. “La detección de endosulfan en las muestras de sangre y agua, 10 meses después de la última aspersión de endosulfan, significa una exposición continua al endosulfan”, dice el informe. Aunque el estudio de FIPPAT fue comisionado al PCK, este fue presentado por Dave de PMFAI en una conferencia de prensa en Kozhikode y Thiruvananthapuram, donde apartes seleccionados se reprodujeron para la prensa. “Esto claramente señala los nexos entre la industria- PCK y FIPPAT,” dice Jayakumar. Activistas en Kerala y gente de Kasaragod habían marcado el estudio de FIPPAT como “un esfuerzo bien orquestado de la industria”.
Un incidente interesante que prueba el nexo entre la industria y los laboratorios privados ocurrió cuando la industria hizo una presentación ante el Comité de Achyuthan. El científico de FIPPAT, A Ramesh, acompañó al grupo de la industria que incluía a Dave y S Ganesan de Excel Industries. “Irónicamente el científico de FIPPAT no acompañó al grupo de PCK, que había solicitado el estudio,” dice Achyuthan. Cuando Down To Earth preguntó al Director de FIPPAT que negocio tenía el científico al acompañar al grupo de la industria a una reunión con un Comité del gobierno, él dijo: “Él podría haber ido en el mismo carro, pero no estaba con ellos”. Cuando se le dijo que las criticas de Ramesh del análisis del CSE se registraron en el informe final del comité, él dio una respuesta contradictoria, “No es un gran crimen (acompañar el grupo de la industria), pero no estamos asociados con ninguna industria.”
La intimidación ingeniosa
Los próximos blancos de la industria fueron científicos y funcionarios que estaban en los comités que podían decidir sobre la suerte del endosulfan.
Némesis de la industria
Un informe del Instituto Nacional de Salud Ocupacional se pregunta sobre el endosulfan. ¿Por qué los productores de plaguicidas lo quieren mantener a toda costa?
En agosto del 2001, la Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (NHRC) solicitó al Consejo Hindú de Investigación Médica (Indian Council of Medical Research, ICMR), someter un informe sobre los riesgos a la salud debidos a las aspersiones con endosulfan en las plantaciones de marañón en el distrito de Kasaragod durante cuatro meses. La ICMR a su vez solicitó al Instituto Nacional de Salud Ocupacional (NIOH) en Ahmedabad, que enviara un grupo a Kerala.
Un grupo de tres miembros del NIOH — conformado por el Director del NIOH, H N Saiyed, el diputado Aruna Dewan y H R Rajmohan del Centro Regional de salud ocupacional (Regional Occupational Health Centre, ROHC) en Bangalore — visitaron el distrito en agosto 9-11 y de nuevo en septiembre. Ellos tenían un mandato claro: un estudio epidemiológico ambiental a través de las zonas para investigar el patrón de la enfermedad en las villas afectadas y en una población control.
El grupo fue conducido por Saiyed y estaba conformado por miembros de NIOH, ROHC y el Departamento Pediátrico del Kasturba Medical College en Mangalore. El estudio de campo fue conducido entre septiembre 24 y octubre 7. En la primera fase, muestras de sangre de 262 niños de escuela (170 expuestos y 92 control) se colectaron para detectar residuos de endosulfan, análisis hormonal, hormonas de la tiroides, hormonas sexuales y estudios citogenéticos.
Es significativo que el grupo del NIOH decidió seleccionar un grupo control. Un grupo control es comparable con el grupo expuesto en todos los aspectos, excepto por la exposición al insecticida en este caso el endosulfan.
El informe de NIOH indica que endosulfan es la causa de un buen número de problemas de salud entre los niños de escuela que viven en las zonas expuestas. Estos niños tienen significativamente un menor nivel de inteligencia que el grupo control. Ellos también tienen una alta incidencia de varios desordenes sexuales cuando se los compara con el grupo control.
El informe finalizó en marzo del 2002, pero ha sido mantenido en secreto. Solo unos pocos tienen acceso a sus resultados. Down To Earth se las arregló para conseguir una copia, del cual solo hay disponibles unas pocas copias. Muchos activistas y los medios periodísticos no tienen una sola información de los hallazgos. “Este maldito informe se ha mantenido en secreto debido a que claramente implica la industria de los plaguicidas”, pregunta Jayakumar C de Thanal, una ONG de Thiruvananthapuram.
El negocio del envenenamiento
Endosulfan constituye solo una pequeña porción del mercado de plaguicidas. ¿Entonces por qué la industria esta paranoica?
La protesta contra el endosulfan en Kerala ha sido un símbolo de lucha contra plaguicidas en la India. La industria de plaguicidas está preocupada con el endosulfan así como con otros de sus productos. Como Dave orgullosamente lo pone, “Yo no defiendo solo una molécula, soy el presidente de 200 moléculas. Nosotros no prohibimos cualquier cosa solo sobre la base de que esté prohibido en otros países”. Si endosulfan se prohibe en Kerala, esto podría tener un efecto de cascada en el resto del país.
Una campaña exitosa para prohibir un plaguicida en particular alimentaria el fuego para otros movimientos también en la India. Más plaguicidas deberían estar bajo escrutinio. Más comunidades deberían sentirse animadas a protestar. Y más plaguicidas deberían estar en la lista negra. Esto es algo que la industria no puede permitir que ocurra. Hay informes de que un problema similar ocurre en Karnataka.
La Corporación de Desarrollo de Karnataka del Marañón (The Karnataka Cashew Development Corporation) ha estado asperjando el endosulfan sobre sus plantaciones en los distritos de Dakshina Kannada y Udipi desde 1987. La gente en estas áreas está también sufriendo de enfermedades extrañas (ver ‘Double Trouble’, Down To Earth, Vol 10, No 11).
Un plan de un juego largo
La mira de la campaña de la industria es, de hecho, mucho más grande. Es estrangular todas las voces que están abogando por una prohibición de los plaguicidas. En el ámbito mundial, la concientización acerca de los efectos dañinos de los plaguicidas en humanos así como en el ambiente está incrementándose. Los gobiernos están amarrados a la presión de los grupos civiles de la sociedad para prohibir plaguicidas y químicos dañinos. El año pasado, Colombia prohibió el endosulfan. Filipinas reinstaló la prohibición del endosulfan después de una larga batalla con la industria. Otros países están restringiendo el uso de este insecticida ó prohibiendo su uso completamente. La industria está sintiendo el calor por más de una razón. Recientemente, la India firmó la Convención de Estocolmo, un tratado global para proteger la salud humana y el ambiente de polutos orgánicos persistentes (POPS). Los Pops son químicos que permanecen en el ambiente por largos periodos de tiempo. Al implementar la Convención, los gobiernos eliminarían o reducirían la liberación de Pops en el ambiente. En la primera fase, 12 Pops se han identificado para ser eliminados. Endosulfan no está aún en esta lista, pero tiene todos los ingredientes para hacerlo en la próxima ronda.
A medida que la presión de los consumidores aumenta, las organizaciones corporativas se están alejando voluntariamente de los plaguicidas. “Los representantes de la industria me dijeron que el endosulfan para las plantaciones de marañón es solo un mercado pequeño. Ellos están más interesados en el uso del endosulfan en algodón y en otros estados, dicen que si se prohibe en Kerala, tendría repercusiones en toda la India”, comenta Salam. Cuando a Dave se le preguntó si ellos se sentían amenazados por estas campañas (como la de Kerala) él respondió: “Es solo que tenemos que proteger nuestros intereses y presentar nuestro lado de la historia”.
Reglamentación y Renegados
Las regulaciones de plaguicidas en la India son laxas. La industria ha aprovechado todas las oportunidades para corromper el sistema y el gobierno se ha hecho el ciego ante el problema. Los plaguicidas son regulados bajo el Acta de Insecticidas de 1998 y la reglamentación de los Insecticidas de 1971. En mayo del 2000, La ley 2000 de Insecticidas (Enmienda), se pasó bajo la sombra de muertes suicidas de los agricultores debido a plaguicidas adulterados. Esta enmienda hizo que la penalización por plaguicidas adulterados fuera más estricta. Pero hizo muy poco para limpiar las regulaciones de registro de los plaguicidas y monitorear esta industria del veneno. El Acta de Insecticidas regula la importación, manufactura, venta, transporte, distribución y uso de insecticidas para prevenir cualquier riesgo a la gente y animales. El Comité de registros, constituido bajo la Sección 5 del Acta, registra un insecticida después de verificar su eficacia y seguridad a humanos, animales y el ambiente. La Oficina Central de Insecticidas (Central Insecticides Board, CIB) localizada en Faridabad, Haryana, aconseja a la Union y gobiernos estatales sobre asuntos técnicos. En el 2001, un total de 2718 solicitudes se recibieron para registro, de las cuales 1439 se aprobaron, de acuerdo al gobierno.
Básicamente, hay dos tipos de registros bajo la Sección 9 del Acta de Insecticidas — primaria y secundaria. Cuando una molécula nueva se registra en India consigue un registro primario. Solicitudes subsecuentes para la misma molécula logran el registro secundario. Para registrar una molécula nueva se requiere generar estudios — información dependiente del ambiente bajo las condiciones agroclimáticas de la India e información independiente del ambiente. Los datos independientes del ambiente se pueden tomar directamente de la información existente en otras partes del mundo. Pero la generación de información dependiente del ambiente por lo general toma entre 4-5 años. La información sobre varios sujetos que incluyen toxicología y fitotoxicología es necesario generarla para el registro de cualquier molécula nueva. Una vez que un registro primario existe, otros que solicitan registros nuevos pueden solicitar un registro secundario. Por supuesto estas son solo reglas prescritas por el gobierno pero rara vez se cumplen.
Sistema infestado por plagas
El primer paso para registrar un insecticida nuevo es la generación de información. Este es también el primer paso donde la corrupción se inicia. Una compañía tiene la opción de ir a un laboratorio del gobierno ó a laboratorios privados comerciales aprobados por el gobierno “Las compañías por lo general prefieren los laboratorios privados comerciales ya que ellos pueden generar los resultados y muy rápidamente. Los trámites burocráticos en los laboratorios del gobierno pueden causar grandes demoras”, dice N G Waghle, antes vicepresidente, de Pest Control India Limited. “Los laboratorios privados son los primeros en satisfacer las demandas de la industria”, él adiciona. Donde todo tiene su precio.
“Los procedimientos hindúes para el registro son desconsoladores. Es un gran tamasha,” dice P D Deshmukh, un funcionario antiguo de una industria de plaguicidas. Con una experiencia en la industria de 30 años, Deshmukh tiene anécdotas asombrosas para contar. “Yo conozco un laboratorio que promete generar datos toxicológicos para un producto en un día. Generar estos datos normalmente toma entre un año y año y medio. El director del laboratorio me dijo que él arreglaba el intercambio de cartas por un año — haciéndolas aparecer como si la solicitud se hubiera hecho hace un año. Muchas compañías multinacionales e Hindúes son parte de esta patraña,” alega Deshmukh. “Es tenebroso imaginar cuantos plaguicidas peligrosos han podido llegar a los agricultores sin pruebas adecuadas”, se asusta Waghle.
Recordando sus 35 años de experiencia en la industria, Waghle, recuerda historias chocantes de cómo las compañías han corrompido altos funcionarios de los organismos de registros de plaguicidas. “Las compañías están atentas a contactar directamente los funcionarios del CIB, para que ellos usen los servicios de un negociador”, él dice. Los agentes actúan como un enlace entre la industria y el CIB. El soborno a los funcionarios de bajo y alto perfil en los CIB se hace a través de estos agentes designados. La industria ha convertido estos sobornos en un arte y el agente ó negociador es una parte integral de este juego.
Fea interfase
El negociador es por lo general una cara regular en el CIB, dice Waghle, por lo que los funcionarios se sienten cómodos interactuando con él. La industria paga este agente por todo el trabajo sucio que ellos quieren que se haga — el registro de una nueva molécula, ó robar información de una molécula previamente registrada, ó aún sobornando los miembros del Comité para influenciar la toma de decisiones a alto nivel. Pero el soborno no es siempre dinero.
Muchos altos funcionarios del CIB, incluyendo los miembros del Comité de Registros, regularmente reciben invitaciones a viajes de recreo, dice Waghle. La compañía paga todos los gastos — tiquetes aéreos, acomodaciones en hoteles de cinco estrellas y aún gastos de compras en almacenes. De nuevo no hay una relación directa con la industria, todo es hecho por el agente.
Reglas y renegados
“El funcionario simplemente tiene que informar al agente, con quién tiene después que entrar en contacto la compañía. La compañía paga al agente por todo el trabajo sucio”, él adiciona. Waghle le ha proporcionado a Down To Earth los nombres de unos pocos de los legendarios agentes y de sus clientes.
Las leyes están hechas para proteger a la industria. La industria del endosulfan ha utilizado estos agujeros para su gran provecho. Por ejemplo, el PCK violó muchas regulaciones mientras conducía aspersiones aéreas. El Acta de Insecticidas hace mandatorio que una compañía informe a la gente acerca de las aspersiones aéreas de plaguicidas. Todos los reservorios de aguas en el área deben estar cubiertos durante la aspersión. Pero esto no fue hecho por el PCK. “El CIB ha prescrito que las aspersiones con endosulfan deben ser hechas a una altura no mayor de 2-3 metros sobre el follaje. Pero aún esto no se cumplió en las plantaciones del PCK”, dice L Sundaresan, antiguo Director del Departamento de Agricultura de Kerala.
“Las aspersiones aéreas de endosulfan no fueron permitidas por el CIB después de 1993. El CIB había dado aprobación para las aspersiones aéreas de endosulfan al PCK solo hasta diciembre de 1992. Pero el Departamento de Agricultura en Kerala y el distrito han autorizado aplicaciones aéreas aún hasta enero del 2001”, alega Jayakumar.
La Union del gobierno hizo muchos esfuerzos para hacer el uso de los plaguicidas “seguro”. Esto apuntó hacia los comités. Estos comités permitieron el uso de endosulfan con una palabra de precaución: los plaguicidas deben usarse muy cuidadosamente y especificar las áreas donde no deben ser usados. En 1991 la Union del gobierno organizó un comité liderado por S N Banerjee, anteriormente Consejero del Gobierno en Protección de Plantas, para revisar si algunos plaguicidas, incluyendo endosulfan, deberían ser utilizados en la India. El Comité dijo que el Comité de Registros del CIB no debería permitir el uso del endosulfan cerca a ríos, lagos, mar o pantanos. El Comité también recomendó que se colocara un anuncio de advertencia en todos los rótulos y folletos de los recipientes. En relación con otros anuncios, las compañías despliegan esta advertencia en una letra tan pequeña que es difícil leerla.
Otro Comité liderado por R B Singh, hizo recomendaciones similares en 1999. El reenforzó el hecho de que el rótulo debería ser obligatorio en letras en negrilla para evitar el uso del endosulfan cerca a fuentes de agua. La 195ava reunión del Comité de Registros del CIB, conducida en diciembre de 1999, acordó implementar las recomendaciones. Pero nunca fueron realmente implementadas. El CIB ha escogido sentarse en estas recomendaciones. Endosulfan aún se utiliza indiscriminadamente, como la tragedia de Kasaragod lo muestra.
A la industria de plaguicidas no le gusta las regulaciones del Acta de Insecticidas diciendo que los procedimientos engorrosos para el registro están estrangulando su crecimiento. Pero, viendo la forma que la industria tiene para sortear estos procedimientos, ciertamente, saltándose sobre todas las normas de decencia en el caso del endosulfan, queda muy claro que este negocio “sucio” necesita más y no menos controles. Pero esta vez necesita monitores que tengan un control público. De otra forma, esta industria de muerte llegará a ser aún más mortal en los próximos años.
(Down To Earth, July 15th 2002)
Can I have my cola now?
Here's a classroom on the truth behind the Coke-Pepsi-pesticide controversy in India
By S S Jeevan
Is my soft drink free from pesticides?
No. Both studies -- by the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) as well as the government's Centre Food Technological Research Institute (CFTRI), Mysore -- found pesticide residue in all samples tested. The difference was only in the levels.
What's this thing about pesticides above/below EEC standards?
There are no standards to measure pesticide residue in India for soft drinks. So CSE used the European Economic Community (EEC) norms, and found that all 12 samples had higher levels. CFTRI found pesticide residue above EEC limit in nine samples and below that limit in three samples. So that settles it, your cola has some amount of pesticide.
Why just EEC norms, why not US norms?
Only the European Union has norms that have quantified pesticide residue levels. Even the Indian Government studies have used the same standards.
Will pesticide contaminated colas affect my health in any way?
Pesticide consumption, even in lower levels, cause long-term harm. That's what scientists worldwide say. You'll never know how and when they will trigger a cancer or disrupt your immunity and so on. There are many studies to show how pesticide exposure causes diseases. But till now there's none to link pesticides in soft drinks to diseases.
Why did CSE single out Coke and Pepsi in their campaign? Why not target other soft drink companies?
Believe it or not, almost the entire soft drink market in India is monopolised by these two companies.
Can I sue a company in India which sells me a contaminated product?
No. There are no norms, no binding laws. The industry has not flouted any rules. The rules just do not exist. That's why the cola companies have been given a "clean chit" by the Health minister Sushma Swaraj.
But what about food products that are contaminated with pesticides? Why target only MNC cola companies?
CSE director Sunita Narain calls it a "shock therapy". It is not surprising that today people have started talking about groundwater contamination only because of the soft drink expose.
Then why accuse cola companies when India's groundwater quality is so pathetic?
Years of neglect by the government to the indiscriminate use of pesticides has led to the problem. The other issue is that of corporate responsibility. Cola companies cannot pass the buck saying that the raw water is bad. They need to invest in cleaner technologies to make their products safer. Product stewardship is a concept Indian companies need to get familiar with.
Did the cola companies' campaign strategy to counter the CSE study boomerang?
To a large extent yes. Especially when one saw the cola chiefs sipping tea (not their colas) on television on August 5 (when CSE released its findings) and claiming that their products were safe. Then by questioning the credibility of the CSE study, the cola majors seemed to have lost the trust of some of their consumers. No wonder, soft drinks sales have dipped since then. Then Pepsi went a step ahead. It selectively quoted Sushma Swaraj's speech in Parliament in its huge advertisements to say that their products were safe. Never mind that it had to withdraw the advertisement and issue an apology. If their products do not contain pesticides, why haven't the companies sued CSE till now?
Did the government look like it was favouring the cola companies in the way it responded to the crisis?
The government is under tremendous pressure -- both from the corporate world and from civil society groups. Sushma Swaraj's reply in Parliament reflected only a part of what the government's report had noted. The CFTRI report said that CSE's report and its own cannot be compared as the samples were different. That was not revealed to the media. Also that the pesticide, Lindane, was found in all samples tested at CFTRI. Now, it looks like the government is moving in the right direction. It has notified norms for soft drinks, which prescribe stringent pesticide residue limits.
What's the purpose of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC)?
The JPC doesn't have the credibility to sit in judgement over a purely scientific issue. More so when the commercial interests of corporate houses are involved. Are you as a consumer going to trust a scientist or a parliamentarian to tell you whether the soft drink you consume is safe or not? The setting up of a JPC is also a trusted strategy to let matters cool down. Today, no one in the government will talk to you about the controversy. "I will not reply to such questions," says Swaraj. "The matter is in front of the JPC and I respect its sanctity."
Can stringent norms check pesticide contamination in soft drinks?
Having some norms is better than having no norms. Legal norms help instill a sense of fear in companies. It also enables ordinary citizens to fight back. The important thing now is that of enforcement.
Will strengthening of norms solely benefit the MNCs, as only they have the financial muscle to invest in cleaner technologies. Aren't the smaller players (read Indian) going to suffer?
As we've said earlier, most of the cola market is dominated by MNCs. Strengthening of norms can also help Indian companies compete in the global market, especially as we enter the WTO regime. The basic issue is that of health, not who's going to make more money.
(New Indian Express, September 7, 2003)
By S S Jeevan
Is my soft drink free from pesticides?
No. Both studies -- by the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) as well as the government's Centre Food Technological Research Institute (CFTRI), Mysore -- found pesticide residue in all samples tested. The difference was only in the levels.
What's this thing about pesticides above/below EEC standards?
There are no standards to measure pesticide residue in India for soft drinks. So CSE used the European Economic Community (EEC) norms, and found that all 12 samples had higher levels. CFTRI found pesticide residue above EEC limit in nine samples and below that limit in three samples. So that settles it, your cola has some amount of pesticide.
Why just EEC norms, why not US norms?
Only the European Union has norms that have quantified pesticide residue levels. Even the Indian Government studies have used the same standards.
Will pesticide contaminated colas affect my health in any way?
Pesticide consumption, even in lower levels, cause long-term harm. That's what scientists worldwide say. You'll never know how and when they will trigger a cancer or disrupt your immunity and so on. There are many studies to show how pesticide exposure causes diseases. But till now there's none to link pesticides in soft drinks to diseases.
Why did CSE single out Coke and Pepsi in their campaign? Why not target other soft drink companies?
Believe it or not, almost the entire soft drink market in India is monopolised by these two companies.
Can I sue a company in India which sells me a contaminated product?
No. There are no norms, no binding laws. The industry has not flouted any rules. The rules just do not exist. That's why the cola companies have been given a "clean chit" by the Health minister Sushma Swaraj.
But what about food products that are contaminated with pesticides? Why target only MNC cola companies?
CSE director Sunita Narain calls it a "shock therapy". It is not surprising that today people have started talking about groundwater contamination only because of the soft drink expose.
Then why accuse cola companies when India's groundwater quality is so pathetic?
Years of neglect by the government to the indiscriminate use of pesticides has led to the problem. The other issue is that of corporate responsibility. Cola companies cannot pass the buck saying that the raw water is bad. They need to invest in cleaner technologies to make their products safer. Product stewardship is a concept Indian companies need to get familiar with.
Did the cola companies' campaign strategy to counter the CSE study boomerang?
To a large extent yes. Especially when one saw the cola chiefs sipping tea (not their colas) on television on August 5 (when CSE released its findings) and claiming that their products were safe. Then by questioning the credibility of the CSE study, the cola majors seemed to have lost the trust of some of their consumers. No wonder, soft drinks sales have dipped since then. Then Pepsi went a step ahead. It selectively quoted Sushma Swaraj's speech in Parliament in its huge advertisements to say that their products were safe. Never mind that it had to withdraw the advertisement and issue an apology. If their products do not contain pesticides, why haven't the companies sued CSE till now?
Did the government look like it was favouring the cola companies in the way it responded to the crisis?
The government is under tremendous pressure -- both from the corporate world and from civil society groups. Sushma Swaraj's reply in Parliament reflected only a part of what the government's report had noted. The CFTRI report said that CSE's report and its own cannot be compared as the samples were different. That was not revealed to the media. Also that the pesticide, Lindane, was found in all samples tested at CFTRI. Now, it looks like the government is moving in the right direction. It has notified norms for soft drinks, which prescribe stringent pesticide residue limits.
What's the purpose of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC)?
The JPC doesn't have the credibility to sit in judgement over a purely scientific issue. More so when the commercial interests of corporate houses are involved. Are you as a consumer going to trust a scientist or a parliamentarian to tell you whether the soft drink you consume is safe or not? The setting up of a JPC is also a trusted strategy to let matters cool down. Today, no one in the government will talk to you about the controversy. "I will not reply to such questions," says Swaraj. "The matter is in front of the JPC and I respect its sanctity."
Can stringent norms check pesticide contamination in soft drinks?
Having some norms is better than having no norms. Legal norms help instill a sense of fear in companies. It also enables ordinary citizens to fight back. The important thing now is that of enforcement.
Will strengthening of norms solely benefit the MNCs, as only they have the financial muscle to invest in cleaner technologies. Aren't the smaller players (read Indian) going to suffer?
As we've said earlier, most of the cola market is dominated by MNCs. Strengthening of norms can also help Indian companies compete in the global market, especially as we enter the WTO regime. The basic issue is that of health, not who's going to make more money.
(New Indian Express, September 7, 2003)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)